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Abstract 
The European Union (EU) has significantly increased its formal competencies in the 
area of drug policy since the Treaty of European Union (TEU) yet in practice drug 
policies remain varied from state to state.  It is said that a European approach to 
drugs policy has developed, and that this is characterised „as one in which evidence 
takes priority over ideology‟.  This paper seeks to better understand European 
integration in the field of drug policy and particularly the creation of this 
characteristic approach using the theoretical approach of Europeanization. 
After examining the growing body of literature on Europeanization and the sources 
available in drug policy analysis, the first empirical section examines the history of 
drugs policy in the EU, from its intergovernmental beginnings towards the 
development of more independent EU institutions.  It pays particular attention to the 
work of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) 
and Europol, as well as the effects of the EU drug strategies and action plans, on 
wider drug policy.  It is demonstrated that the generation, collection and 
dissemination of information and intelligence play vital roles in the consolidation of 
European norms.  
The second empirical section looks at the domestic impact of the EU on the UK and 
demonstrates how the UK, throughout the past 20 years, has sought to contest EU 
actions in the area and promote its own policy preferences.  The UK has been 
successful in using European norms to further its own policy preferences and played 
a leading role in the generation of drug information.  In recent years, however the 
UK‟s approach to law enforcement has been directly influenced by earlier EU norms. 
 
Key Words: Europeanization, European Union, Drug Policy, Europol, United 
Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
Preface…………………………………………………………………………………. i 
Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………................. ii 
Author’s Declaration………………………………………………………………… ii 
1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………… 1 
2. Europeanization & Drug Policy: Theory and Epistemology…………………. 6 
2.1 Europeanization, communication and policy learning…………………………… 6 
2.2 Justice and Home Affairs – on the margins of political science………………….. 13 
2.3 Drug policy – Critical Analysis? ………………………………………............... 15 
3. Methods & Research Design……………………………………………………. 18 
3.1 Engaging with complexity – the case study method…………………………….. 18 
3.2 Case Selection – The UK: the „Jekyll & Hyde‟ of Europe…………..………….. 23 
3.3 Data & Sources…………………………………………………………………... 26 
4. Joint European Action in Supply Reduction and the EU’s Impact….………. 30 
4.1 Pre-1992: The foundations of EU involvement…………………………………. 30 
4.2 1992-2000: Towards a modern drug policy……………………….…………….. 34 
4.3 2000-2008: A comprehensive and concrete approach…………………………... 39 
4.4 2008-present: Beyond the comprehensive approach……………...…………….. 45 
5. UK Drug Policy………………………………………………….……………… 49 
5.1 Pre-1992: Origins of UK policy - bringing intelligence to the fore…………….. 50 
5.2 1992-2000: The First UK Policies……………………………………………….. 55 
5.3 2000-2008: SOCA and the institutionalisation of information…………............. 59 
5.4 2008-present: Law enforcement and harm reduction…………………..………. 64 
6. Conclusions…………………………………...………………………………...... 67 
Annex A – Supply Reduction in the EU Action Plan……………………………….. 72 
Bibliography… …………………………………………………………..…...………. 75 
 
 
 
 
List of Figures and Tables 
Figure 1 - A Typical Demand Reduction/Supply Reduction Model……………20 
Table 1 - European Drug Statistics………………………………………………24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i 
 
Preface 
Between January 2009 and October 2010 I worked in the European Monitoring 
Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), in Lisbon, Portugal, as an intern 
in the Crime and Markets Unit.  The EMCDDA is at the forefront of the EU‟s drug 
policy as the agency responsible for collecting and publishing comparable data on 
the drug phenomenon in Europe.  When I arrived I expected to find an agency full of 
national difficulties, with 30 countries obliged to report their data in some kind of 
comparable format, I thought rivalries and misunderstandings would be 
commonplace.  I expected typically eurosceptic countries to be distant and cagey and 
Europhile countries to be proactive and I expected the smaller countries to be in a 
weaker position than the larger countries. 
Instead what I found was an agency which did not fit into any kind of stereotype of 
European integration.  National and international experts would sit down together in 
order to increase the understanding and knowledge of drugs across Europe.  The 
currency that the EMCDDA trades in is its scientific integrity and reliability.  In 
order to build on this the agency has developed, in conjunction with national experts, 
a set of standards which makes the EMCDDA‟s data collection some of the most 
respected in the field.  That is not to say the experts or the agency are always in 
agreement, I witnessed many such conflicts, but the point is to work out these 
disagreements to come to a shared understanding. 
The EMCDDA is well aware of the deficiencies both in the data it already collects 
and the data it doesn‟t yet have the skill, knowledge or systems to collect and in 
continually working with the Member-states to further this knowledge.  Recently this 
has manifested itself in a desire to increase the reliability and comparability of data 
related to drug „supply reduction‟, drug policies intimately connected with law 
enforcement, which for a long time have been where the majority of national policy 
resources have gone but about which comparatively little is known. 
The aim of this paper is to use my experience at the EMCDDA, along with extensive 
further research, to demonstrate how the policies of one country, the UK, can 
interact, influence and be influenced by such an institutional arrangement. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The European approach to drugs can be characterised as one in 
which evidence takes priority over ideology. 
(EMCDDA, 2010, 13) 
 
European integration, since the 1950s, has run parallel to the development of a 
mature international market for narcotic and psychotropic substances, with supply 
lines which extend from known areas of production, via transit points, to primary 
consumer markets (Europol, 2009; UNODC, 2009).  The European Union (EU) is 
currently the second largest consumer market for illicit drugs in the world, after 
North America (EMCDDA, 2009; UNODC, 2009).  It has been argued that the 
creation of the single European market for licit goods and services has had the 
unintended consequence of providing criminals with increased, transnational, 
opportunities. (Fijnaut & Paoli, 2004; Monar, 2006).  It is this realization, and the 
desire to defend the single market against these threats, that has resulted in the EU 
gaining competencies in coordinating the fight against cross-border crime and, 
therefore, in combating drug trafficking1 (Elvins, 2003: 70; Turnbull & Sandholtz, 
2001).   Although the EU has consistently supported comprehensive and 'horizontal' 
drugs policies, the policies themselves invariably involve a number of policy 
constellations.  In this paper I will be focusing on one of the policy areas which very 
recently has been of  great scientific interest amongst drug policy analysts 
(EMCDDA, 2010?), that of supply reduction.   
 
It has been argued that the EU was only weakly involved in Third Pillar affairs due 
to the limited roles given to European institutions in the treaties constructing the 
Union (c.f. Sukalac, 1997).  Whilst it is true that formal processes of harmonisation 
and hard law have been rarely used in this policy area a significant amount of soft 
law and informal 'socialisation' has gone on which has allowed the EU and Member-
states (MS) to develop a 'common approach' to drugs policies whilst maintaining the 
                                                          
1 Article K.1 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) specifically states, “For the purposes of 
achieving the objectives of the Union, particularly the free movement of persons…Member-states 
shall regard the following areas as matters of common interest:…(9) police cooperation for the 
purposes of preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms 
of international crime,” 
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legal sovereignty and diversity of Member-states.  As the recent quote from the 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) explains, 
this is an approach that values evidence, and by extension information and 
intelligence, and seeks to use the gathering and dissemination of information as a 
means to bring MS policies closer together.   
 
On the face of it, ceteris paribus, the policies of the international drugs control 
regime would appear to be relatively homogeneous; states are obliged, under the 
conditions of three United Nations (UN) conventions, to prohibit the trafficking of 
scheduled drugs by means of criminal penalties (INCB, 2008; UNODC, 2009).  
Signatories are given a great degree of discretion in how they transpose these 
requirements into domestic law, with consideration to the large variety of legal 
systems and cultures, and indeed how these laws are interpreted and practice varies 
widely. As with most social policies, regulatory instruments (which provide 
punishment) are only one dimension of a broader public policy which also includes 
incentivisation (providing rewards and benefits) and communication (providing 
experience and information) amongst other policy tools (Hall, 1993; Knill, 2005; 
Knill et al, 2009).   
 
The EU is often seen as a region with a particularly similar approach to tackling 
drugs, especially seen in light of the united positions taken and joint declarations 
given at international fora such as the UN Congress on Narcotic Drugs.  In addition 
to transposing the UN conventions into the acquis communautaire the EU has 
actively developed a number of policies of its own, in response to the problem of 
drug supply, which aim to coordinate MS cooperation and encourage communication 
between MS and policy actors.  Despite their common foundations, European drug 
policies continue to differ greatly at the domestic level (EMCDDA, 2009b; Jelsma, 
2008).  Both the level of EU involvement in domestic drug policies, as well as the 
impact of European institutions has been greatly contested by scholars.  
Intergovernmentalists have argued that this policy area, and all those that fell under 
the Third Pillar, remained under national control, ultimately subject to national policy 
preferences, an argument essentially supported by a close reading of the provisions 
of the EU treaties which severely limit the decision-making capabilities of the EU 
institutions.  However, as this paper will seek to demonstrate, the scope of EU 
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decision-making goes beyond a legalistic reading or the creation of 'hard law' and, 
indeed, the evolution of EU policies over time provides empirical evidence of how 
EU wide policies can be shaped by domestic constraints and can mediate domestic 
preferences as well as shaping domestic policies themselves, even in a supposedly 
intergovernmental area.   
 
Europeanization scholarship has provided a departure from traditional grand theories 
of European integration, such as intergovernmentalism and neofuctionalism, which 
have focused largely on the level of European institutions and the outputs at this 
level (Vink, 2002).  By making domestic change the dependent variable, much can 
be learned about the sources of domestic politics regardless of the level from which it 
comes.  In the case of drug supply reduction policy, however,  that domestic change, 
even in the presence of both domestic and EU adaptational pressure, is minimal and 
even contested.  This situation will be used to further bound the concept of 
Europeanization as a process of interaction between domestic and EU politics rather 
than a purely linear process.    
 
Conceptualising Europeanization as a process through which MS feed policy 
problems and preferences into an EU institutional mechanism, before having them 
reflected back at the domestic level, allows us to explain adaptation or resistance as 
the product of a series of interactions, negotiations and compromises.  In the area of 
drug supply reduction, domestic consensus regarding EU involvement in the area 
broke down when presented with the policy options of an independently acting EU – 
the „second image reversed‟ presented the MS with a reflection they found 
unpalatable.  Whilst MS maintain that drug trafficking is a problem that faces the 
whole of the EU there is still no consensus on how this should be dealt with at the 
EU level, what the priorities are and where the resources should be spent.  Despite a 
long  history of European cooperation at the political and technical level, attempts by 
the EU to facilitate operational coordination in supply reduction measures have been 
resisted at the domestic level and the compromises and negotiations in this area are 
demonstrated by an evolution in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) policies.   
 
This paper will seek to show this evolution by demonstrating that since the 
introduction of the policy area into EU affairs a consensus has been arrived, amongst 
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MS and within the EU, that international drug trafficking constitutes a serious 
domestic threat in terms of health and security, which, due to the functioning of the 
single-market and the opening of borders to people, goods and services, means there 
is „added-value‟ for MS in dealing with some aspects of drug policy strategically at 
the EU level.  These conditions have led to the development of EU institutions of 
governance, decision-making and otherwise, with competencies in the field of supply 
reduction, which help to shape the policies of the EU.  These institutions include the 
European Commission and Agencies such as the European Monitoring Centre for 
Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), Europol and Eurojust.  Consensus on the 
presence of a common policy problem has not been complimented by a consensus on 
policy solutions at the operational level, as demonstrated by an evident gap between 
policy intentions and policy outcomes – the continued differentiation of domestic 
policies.  Domestic dissensus has allowed independent EU level institutional logic to 
compete with domestic logic.  As a means of both restoring a domestic consensus 
and strengthening the EU‟s bargaining position the logic of EU involvement has 
developed from facilitating unstructured, ad hoc, intergovernmental communication 
towards promoting structured, institutionalized, multi-level communication and the 
creation of a body of European-wide information and evidence.  In recognising the 
importance of shared information and evidence and the creation of expert level 
groups the EU has better manage bond European policies and create a more effective 
overarching strategy. 
 
To demonstrate this hypothesis I will be using the relationship between the EU and 
the United Kingdom (UK) as a case study.  The UK presents a particularly interesting 
case in terms of its involvement with the EU as it is commonly viewed as a 'Jekyll 
and Hyde' partner in European integration (Brown Pappamikail, 1998).  On the one 
hand successive UK governments have found it politically beneficial to publicly 
criticise deeper European integration and these reservations are formally manifested 
in the various opt-outs and opt-ins maintained in a number of key policy areas, 
including in JHA and the Schengen Accord.  On the other hand, in both private 
meetings and through the interaction of UK national experts and 'technocrats' in 
Brussels and elsewhere it is generally agreed that further European integration is a 
positive means of achieving the UK's own policy preferences. 
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Due to the policy op-outs and its publicly reserved appearance, the UK has often 
been seen as a policy foot-dragger, particularly in the area of JHA, however this 
paper will demonstrate that by actively engaging in every stage of the EU's supply 
reduction agenda, from the drafting of comprehensive strategy documents to the  
participation within.  Whilst Germany was originally considered to be a policy pace-
setter in the JHA arena, and specifically in the promotion of a European-wide police 
force, with investigative and operational powers, along the lines of their own federal 
Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) (Monar, 2001; Woodward, 1993), the UK has taken over 
this role, shaping policies more towards its own preferences.  Through European 
agencies and committees, including Europol, the UK has successfully promoted its 
own models and policies.  The UK's strategic policy documents and the functioning 
of law enforcement agencies such as the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) 
mirror closely, in terms of aims and goals, what would be considered the 'European 
model'.  In more recent years the UK's promotion of both intelligence-led policing 
and the increased use of scientifically gathered information and scientific research to 
supplement and support law enforcement policies and responses have led to the UK 
being one of the most 'European' of the MS in terms of the drug supply reduction 
policies. 
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2. Europeanization & Drug Policy: Theory and Epistemology 
 
2.1  Europeanization, communication and policy learning 
 
Since its inception as an economic and trade union the EU has developed a much 
wider and more comprehensive portfolio of policy competencies.  There now appear 
to be few policy areas in which Member-states have sole responsibility and almost all 
European ministries or government departments will, in some way, be involved with 
EU affairs.  In seeking to explain this shift in decision-making power and control 
from the nation-state to a supranational body, two broad schools have developed 
which approach the issue from different angles and which put different emphasis on 
the structures and power relationships involved.  Intergovernmentalists, such as 
Andrew Moravcsik, have argued that decision-making at the EU level has been 
largely propelled by the needs of rationally acting MS who have pooled their 
resources for the sake of achieving previously identified national benefits. However, 
due to MS veto power (or at the least the consensual nature of much of the decision-
making in the EU), the MS remain in the driving seat (Moravcsik, 1993).  On the 
other hand there is another school of thought which argues that when political 
institutions are created they are created with an autonomy of action „built in‟ to their 
design and which provides autonomy of action through the independent beliefs and 
norms of their actors.  This is done to protect these institutions from being taken over 
by political rivals when political power shifts (Lowndes, 1996).  In the case of the 
EU, neo-functionalists have argued that institutions that were originally designed 
solely for the purpose of economic cooperation have grown, multiplied and distorted 
from their original roles, through a process of policy „spillover‟, into the wide range 
of policy areas seen today (Haas, 1961). 
 
Recent literature has, however, been concerned that these grand theories of European 
integration struggle to either predict or explain the growth in the EU policy sphere 
and its timing (Ladrech, 1994; Vink, 2003).  In the context of drug policies it does 
seem that the time between the Schengen Accord and the Maastricht Treaty was the 
natural period for the EU to extend its activities in the area of illicit drug policies.  At 
this time, when the internal borders of Europe were opened and the single market 
created, there was a concern that these opportunities for legal trade could easily be 
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exploited by transnational criminals.  This, however, could be interpreted as either 
natural spillover effect from economic policies or else exploitation by the MS 
seeking to further their own policy goals, for example by strengthening police 
powers and investigative capacity.  The grand theories are often unable to 
definitively answer this 'chicken vs. egg' question related to the breadth of European 
integration because they are largely concerned with change at the EU level and the 
domestic level if often ignored.  Due to this focus on EU construction, neither can 
they explain, with a degree of certainty, the depth of integration, to explain how far 
integration has progressed within the MS and, perhaps most importantly, the 
differentiated depth of integration between policy areas and in different MS.  Perhaps 
the most fundamental developmental change in the EU occurred between 1986 and 
1993, that is the signing and implementation of the Single European Act (SEA) and 
the Maastricht Treaty, which prompted a shift in focus in academic research, 
realising that using the EU as a research focus only gave half the picture the idea of 
Europeanization was to move the focus back to the MS level.  
 
The large expansion of the EU‟s policy portfolio, the formalization of the institutions 
of governance necessary for the expansion, combined with the inability of the grand 
theories to provide explanations, led to an important development in European 
scholarship.  A new research agenda emerged which, in a departure from previous 
EU scholarship concerned with the construction of EU level institutions and politics, 
focused primarily on the effect of the EU on domestic level institutions and politics.  
Europeanization, as this approach is known, became an increasingly popular term in 
political science, even spreading to other disciplines (Vink, 2003), from economics to 
legal studies, where the effects of European integration were needed to be understood 
and analysed.   
 
A striking feature of the new research agenda was its early popularity which had the 
consequence of creating a contested conceptualization with up to  8 different 
definitions being used regularly in the literature (Buller & Gamble, 2002; Olsen, 
2002), however, as the field has matured and, importantly as more empirical studies 
have been undertaken, some conventions have coalesced.  Nevertheless, it is still 
important to clearly state which definition will be used in this paper as this has a 
fundamental impact on the parameters of the research.  Europeanization is not 
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synonymous with convergence, neither harmonization, nor political integration, and 
should not be reduced to policy making at the EU level (Radaelli, 2000b:7) although 
the study of Europeanization is intrinsically linked with these phenomena.  In its 
broadest terms Europeanization literature attempts to “explain the domestic impacts 
of European integration on actors, processes and structures” (Bolleyer & Radaelli, 
2009: 384), but its development should also be understood as a step beyond more 
traditional theories of European integration, such as supranationalism, 
neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism (Quaglia et el, 2007), in that it is 
understood as a process of interaction between MS and a (partially) autonomous EU 
with distinct institutional2 attributes (Ladrech, 1994; Radaelli, 2000b: 3).   
 
Early Europeanization scholarship adopted a „top-down‟ approach by which the 
effects of EU-level politics on domestic politics were examined but it was quickly 
realised that, just as constructivist approaches to the creation of the EU missed much 
of the information, this approach too did not fully explain the European policy 
picture.  Therefor more recent literature on the subject takes into account domestic 
inputs and preferences too and the effects they have on the nature of EU policies.  
This paper will demonstrate the importance of both of these dimensions as part of the 
overall process and, as such, will adopt Bulmer and Radaelli‟s definition of 
Europeanization: 
 
“processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalisation of 
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, „ways of 
doing things‟ and shared beliefs and norms which are first consolidated 
in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic 
(national and sub-national) discourse, political structures and public 
policies.” 
(Bulmer & Radaelli, 2005: 341) 
Such a definition fits in well with the historical-institutionalist agenda, being that it 
concerns a process which naturally occurs over time and primarily involves the 
creation of rules, norms and beliefs. 
                                                          
2 Institutions here are defined rather broadly as, „accepted and established sets of rules, norms and 
frameworks, with specific beliefs, competencies and legitimacy.‟ (from North, 1990 quoted in 
Pierson, 1996: 126; see also Lowndes, 1996: 182).   
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Political change is not easy to engineer and one of the fundamental characteristics of 
an institution is its resistance to change.  Knill (2001, p135) argues that domestic 
administrative transformation requires two conditions, firstly the maintenance of a 
moderate level of adaptational pressure and secondly the support of domestic actor 
coalitions.  One of the flaws of the approaches of integration macro-theories is that 
the effects of decision making institutions, and importantly the decision-enforcing 
instruments, are blunted by the principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and 
flexibility.  These principles are fundamental to recent EU governance and dictate 
that decisions should be made as close to the citizen as possible, only where 
appropriate and MS should have freedom to adapt policy to their particular social and 
political context.   These are dimensions that Europeanization research has tackled in 
the past.  It is often the case that MS bring their own dishes to an already 
overwhelmed policy buffet but have the freedom to choose what they eat (or whether 
they eat at all). 
 
The development of the Europeanization research agenda as a means to examine the 
increased competence of the EU, the policy areas covered by the literature have so 
far not strayed from the first „communitised‟ pillar.  Spheres such as environmental 
policy (Börzel, 2001), transport policy (Héretier et al, 2001), monetary policy 
(Radaelli, 2000a) and even education policy (Bache, 2006) have all received much 
scholarly attention, something which can perhaps be explained by the fact that in 
these policy areas it is understood that MS have delegated a great deal of power to 
the EU3.  In the second and third pillars, or what were collectively known as the 
„intergovernmental pillars‟, the received wisdom was that until the reforms of the 
Lisbon Treaty, and the abolition of the pillar structure, policy matters remained 
firmly in the hands of MS governments.  This however vastly simplifies the working 
arrangements and dynamics of the areas in question, as Baker and Harding (2009:26) 
comment:  
“it would be premature to conclude that the effect [of the Treaty of 
Lisbon]…will be to complete a long-term trajectory…from an 
                                                          
3 Delegation of power in this respect should not be confused with a delegation of competency.  The delegation of competencies 
as agreed in Title 1, Art 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00014.en07.pdf) 
bares little correlation to the modes of governance employed by the EU in these areas as described by Knill & Lenschow 
(2005). 
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unequivocally intergovernmental past to a similarly supranational 
future.  There are signs that the heritage of complicated and obscure 
method [in the Third Pillar] may still be resilient and influential.” 
 
One of the most important of the early conclusions of Europeanization literature was 
that the effect of Europe is not felt and reflected equally amongst MS leading to 
greater or lesser degrees of differentiation (Heretier et al, 2001).  This differentiation 
has not been viewed as particularly detrimental to the European project (European 
Commission, 2001) in fact it has been argued that given the concerns regarding loss 
of sovereignty at the domestic level, plus the complexities of working with 27 
different political cultures, this state of affairs is to be expected and encouraged 
(ibid).  The complexity of interaction between actors at the EU and MS level 
(Pierson, 1996), along with the expected differentiation in national outcomes, has 
made establishing causality particularly difficult. 
 
One feature of the EU that supports the argument that it is unique amongst 
international organizations is the sheer variety of modes of governance available and 
the flexibility with which they are used.  Distinct from the instruments of governance 
available to the EU, such as the use of directives or committees, which are set out in 
the treaties, the modes of governance are the overarching strategies of policy control 
between the EU and MS. These modes have been labelled compliance, competition 
and communication by Knill & Lenschow, (2005) which amount to similar principles 
as described by Bulmer and Radaelli (2005: p341) when they refer to hierarchy, 
negotiation and facilitated coordination.  Compliance signifies the imposition of 
binding rules on MS which, if transgressed, have real consequences.  Competition is 
the insistence that MS remove barriers that inhibit fair competition, and 
communication is the provision of arenas (or „laboratories‟) in which ideas might be 
exchanged.  Although it is acknowledged that within specific policy areas two or 
more modes of governance may be used simultaneously (Knill et al, 2009: p523), it 
has been argued that the Third Pillar has primarily used governance by 
communication (or „facilitated coordination‟) (Baker & Harding, 2009; Bulmer & 
Radaelli, 2005; Monar, 2001; Turnbull & Sandholtz, 2001).  This is demonstrated by 
the large number of policy „laboratories‟, such as the European Police Office 
(Europol), Eurojust and the European Police College (CEPOL), that have been 
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created in this area.  The idea of these laboratories is to foster a change in 
institutional beliefs, as well as promoting „Europeanness‟ and policy exchangein 
addition to any form of operational role they might have (Council of the European 
Union, 2009: p9).  In terms of compliance modes, between 1999-2003, the JHA 
arena accounted 0.1% of EU regulations in place, compared to 5.7% in the 
environment and consumer protection and 42.4% in agriculture and fisheries 
(Christensen, 2010: p11). 
 
The use of communication as a governance strategy has increased massively since 
the inclusion of social and home affairs in the EU policy portfolio which, it has been 
argued, is something of a counterbalance to the high degree of sovereignty 
maintained by MS (Hooghe and Marks, 2001).  It argues that policy networks work 
at a number of different political and geographical levels, through and around 
national governments.  When MS cannot or will not commit themselves to binding 
decisions then policy learning, through policy networks, has been viewed as a means 
to establish some form of domestic policy coordination. 
 
Policy learning is aimed at, and impacts on, networks at different political levels – 
“EU level learning”, “Hierarchical learning” and “social, or bottom-up, learning” 
(Radaelli, 2008: p241), returning to the previous definition of Europeanization it 
could be suggested that the processes up to EU level and back down to the MS level 
may contain, to a greater or lesser degree, elements of policy learning.  In redefining 
guidelines or rewriting policy documents, after the experience and evidence of MS 
implementation efforts, policy relevant knowledge diffuses to the EU from the  
bottom up (ibid: p244). 
 
Since the development of communication as a legitimate EU mode of governance a 
more formalized version has been developed.  The Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC) was aimed at social policy areas and was launched at the Lisbon European 
Council of 2000.  The OMC provides a structured framework of agreed benchmarks 
and timetables, and other „soft law instruments‟ by which MS policy implementation 
may be assessed.  Naturally the rigid format of the framework has allowed 
researchers a great opportunity and much has been written about the observed and 
perceived successes and failures of this system through a variety of policy spheres in 
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which it has been used.  This, however, has led to other systems of communication 
and policy learning, often less formalized but older and more established, being 
largely ignored by researchers.  Drug Policy is not party to the OMC, but has been a 
sphere in which many of the elements have been tested in a more informal manner.  
The development of Europe-wide expert networks, coordinated by a central EU focal 
point, has been long established in the drug field, as has the development and 
implementation of scientific indicators, guidelines and „best practice‟.  This “open 
method of coordination in disguise” has been identified in direct taxation (Radaelli, 
2008: p242), but unfortunately seems to have been ignored in the case of drugs 
policy.  One suggestion for this lack of engagement is the complexity of the policy 
field, as well as the problems with data and the multidisciplinary nature of the field 
but these reasons are discussed in more detail in the research design section. 
 
The field of drug policy has also been at the forefront of what has become known as 
„agencification‟, in which policy goals are achieved through the creation of 
independent EU agencies.  The roles of these agencies vary but can generally be 
divided into three classes: information and monitoring (I & M), co-ordination and 
capacity building (C & C), and regulation and oversight (R & O) and are independent 
to a greater or lesser degree (Wonka & Rittburger, 2010).  Agencies are an 
increasingly popular tool in European governance because, although they may be 
influenced by the domestic preferences of MS, they are out of the direct control of 
the MS.  There are a number of agencies involved in the drug policy sphere but this 
paper will concern itself with three in particular:  The European Monitoring Centre 
for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), the European Police Office (Europol) 
and the European Judicial Office (Eurojust). 
 
As well as influencing the modes of EU governance, national preferences have a 
fundamental impact on the modes of adaptation which are „downloaded‟ to the MS 
(Börzel, 2002; Bulmer & Radaelli, 2005).  Whilst it is argued that there is sufficient 
evidence that adaptational pressure alone (at both the EU and national level) is not a 
good indicator of whether Europeanization takes place (Bulmer & Radaelli, 2005), 
this pressure will be different across MS dependant on existing domestic policies, 
institutions and beliefs (Börzel & Risse, 2000; Heretier, et al, 2001; Lenschow et al, 
2005) and also the policy dimension adapted (Knill et al, 2009).  Whilst EU drug 
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policies have provided MS with a level of adaptational pressure, this is not sufficient 
in itself to promote domestic change.  EU adaptational pressure has been successfully 
resisted by domestic actors (Knill, 2005: p135). 
 
As a final word on Europeanization and policy learning in the Third Pillar it must be 
mentioned that relatively little has been written about the effects of epistemic 
communities on the process.  There are several factors which would suggest that the 
drug policy sphere would be an idea arena for epistemic communities to flourish, 
these include the complexity of the area, the scarcity of data and its highly political 
(and also moralistic/subjective) nature (Haas, 1992).  Börzel and Risse (2000) have 
argued, in agreement with Haas‟ general epistemic community hypothesis (ECH) 
(1992), that epistemic communities located at different levels of the EU/MS policy 
process are positioned to successfully induce change and promote new policies.  One 
of the considerations of work in JHA must also be to establish (1) whether these 
communities exist, (2) where they exist and (3) the effects they have on both 
promoting and resisting change.   
 
2.2 Justice and Home Affairs – on the margins of political science 
 
Disciplinary „purity‟ in academic work has both advantages and disadvantages.  On 
the one hand, having a cross disciplinary approach can lead to both theoretical and 
conceptual confusion - on occasions terms can mean very different things in different 
fora4.  Conversely, approaching one field that has traditionally been the domain of 
single discipline from another can offer new insights and a „fresh pair of eyes‟.  
Traditionally the domain of JHA has fallen within legal scholarship and rarely 
approached by traditional political scientists, but, as Connant (2007: p46) 
persuasively argues, the limitations of this are that the social sciences (including 
political science) and law have fundamentally different aspirations and therefore 
methodologies, with legal scholarship much more reliant on narrative.  If we wish to 
examine the area described as “top of the EU‟s policy making agenda” (Monar, 2001: 
                                                          
4 An example of this are the terms regulation, conclusion, and decision which in legal terms have quite 
general meanings whereas in the context of EU studies mean quite specific things (Müller et al, 
2010) and conversely harmonisation, which in legal terms means specifically the change or 
adoption of similar legislation across countries but in political science has been conceptualized in a 
number of different ways. 
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p748) from the perspective of political science then the legal literature is of limited 
use. 
 
That is not to say it is of no use - one of the principle contributions of legal literature 
to EU studies has been its comprehensive narrative account of the progress of the 
JHA policy sphere at the EU level (see for example Baker & Harding, 2009).  
Scholarship in the discipline of political science largely follows a similar narrative 
approach (see Lavenex & Wallace, 2005; Turnbull & Sandholtz, 2001), and perhaps 
the most regular contact between the two words has been Jörg Monar‟s annual 
summaries of activities in the JHA field, in the Journal of Common Market Studies 
annual review (Monar, 2007; Monar: 2008; Monar, 2009). For sake of brevity, the 
history of the policy sphere need not be recounted here other than to state that JHA 
had its beginnings in the Single European Act (SEA) and was formalized in the 
Treaty of Maastricht, this timescale provides a temporal framing for this paper.  The 
current political climate provides an interesting context in which to study the sphere 
of JHA, as the area finds itself undergoing significant change due to the Treaty of 
Lisbon.  The dismantling of the „pillar structure‟ and the incorporation of the policy 
field under the title of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is an indication that 
the governance of the field could be entering a period of adjustment (Baker & 
Harding, 2009: 26).  It is, therefore, an ideal time to assess what the impact of the EU 
has been up to this point. 
 
The specific policy area in question, drugs policy, which is a branch of JHA, has 
been described as emerging onto the scene from a process of institutional innovation 
(Monar, 2001; Turnbull & Sandholtz, 2001) and specifically as an elite-led project 
(Aden, 2001; Elvins, 2003).  An important development in the field has been the 
attempts to circumvent domestic elite groups through the creation of, and reliance on, 
elite groups at the EU level which continue to be one of the fundamental driving 
factors behind EU drug policy (Council of the European Union, 2009b: p8; Loader, 
2002).    The effect of this, it is suggested, has largely been constrained due to, 
amongst other things, a lack of operational capacity at the EU level (Monar, 2006: 
p507) and the continued resistance to these EU institutions at the domestic level 
(Council of the European Union, 2009a: p16). 
 
15 
 
A primary criticism of existing research in the field of JHA, in relation to the aims of 
this paper, is that in addition to being primarily narrative in nature, there is a 
tendency to view policy spheres as one-dimensional.  The focus has largely been on 
cooperation in policing (Aden, 2001; Elvins, 2003; Loader, 2002; Vreugdenhil 2007), 
rather than viewing the whole criminal justice paradigm as the product of the 
interaction between institutions.  With regard to the different legal systems and 
traditions throughout Europe these can be broadly defined as government, law 
enforcement, prosecution, judiciary and corrections.  It would be unlikely that any 
EU impact in drug policy would effect a single institution in isolation and therefore 
this paper aims to provide a cross sectional approach. 
 
2.3 Drugs Policy – Critical analysis? 
 
The international drug control regime has, since its inception, been the subject of a 
great deal of media as well as political attention, a level of attention not yet matched 
by scholarly interest.  As something of a latecomer to the international regulation and 
control of drugs, the impact of the EU has received noticeably less attention than the 
policies of the UN and individual nations (Chatwin, 2003b; MacCoun & Reuter, 
2002; Thoumi, 2009).  By the time that international drug trafficking became matter 
of interest to the EU, informally around the period of the SEA (Elvins, 2003, p70; 
Boekhout van Solinge, 2002), all European MS were already signatories to the most 
important international treaties5.  These treaties ensured that the production, 
trafficking and use of scheduled drugs were subject to criminal sanctions (Thoumi, 
2009; UNODC, 2008). 
 
Since coming onto the European agenda the EU has attempted to present a consistent 
and united policy, both internally (Council of the European Union, 2004) and 
externally, this is despite radically different traditions between MS (Chatwin, 2003b).  
The politicized nature of the international drug control regime has seen the 
promotion of what has been described as a „European model‟ for progressive drug 
                                                          
5 The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was signed in 1961, the Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances was signed in 1971 and negotiations were well under way for the signing of the 
convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in 1988.  A 
detailed history of the international drug regime is provided by the UN in their annex to the 2008 
World Drug Report: 100 Years of Drug Control (UNODC, 2008). 
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policy in opposition to what is often portrayed as a more prohibitionist American 
policy6 (Jelsma, 2008).  Yet many of the studies that advocate this stance are far from 
being scientifically rigorous (for examples of advocacy in the field see Allen et al, 
2003; Green, 1996a; Huling, 1994) and few, if any, address the common challenges 
understood when undertaking cross-national drug policy analysis: Data scarcity; 
Poor data quality and comparability; Weak causal inference, and; Unknown 
generalizability (MacCoun & Reuter, 2002: p8).  These concerns will be addressed in 
more detail in the research design section of this paper. 
 
Much of the current social science research in drugs is aimed at addressing the first 
two of those challenges.  The conceptualisation of drug markets along with the 
responses to them have provided the bulk of recent publications (Brombacher & 
Maihold, 2009; Browne et al, 2003; Bunt et al, 2003; Dorn et al, 2005; Gruppo 
Abele, 2003; Matrix Knowledge Group, 2007; Reuter & Trautman, 2009), yet these 
all concentrate on a bottom-up approach, often with small, local or domestic, points 
of reference and there is, to date, no Europe-wide study examining the impact of the 
EU on domestic drug policies.  Another weakness of current research is its cross 
disciplinary nature: as argued by Ritter (2006) and Dwyer and Moore (2010), rather 
than uniting the field, the cross disciplinary approach has so far succeeded in further 
fragmenting it making comparison more complex.  Whilst this paper does not 
attempt to add to the conceptualisation debate it must, nevertheless, be taken into 
consideration in the research design. 
 
The diffusion of drug policy across the policy spectrum, from crime and border 
control to health and education (for EU coordination in drugs see Boekhout van 
Solinge, 2002; or for a comparison of national coordination see EMCDDA, 2001)  
has presented researchers with an additional complication and has meant that 
empirical studies on the impact of the EU on national policies have, thus far, taken a 
back seat to isolated examinations of national policies or small comparative studies.   
One of the few studies to look at drug policy across the EU from a transversal 
perspective is Chatwin (2003a) who advocates the harmonisation of European drug 
policies based on the similarity of the statistical nature of the illicit drug problem in 
                                                          
6 http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE50T3AK20090130 
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Europe, combined with a stated European will for harmonisation (ibid: p5). Whilst 
the scope of the study is to be applauded, Chatwin relies on criminal justice figures 
and health and prevalence statistics to argue the statistical similarities between the 
countries without taking other national trends into account (EMCDDA, 2007; 
EMCDDA, 2008a; EMCDDA, 2009a).  An example of this would be Chatwin‟s 
comparison of the maximum penalties for drug offences with cannabis prevalence 
rates.  As the recent study by the EMCDDA (2009b) shows, the sentencing of drug 
offenders, aside from being extremely difficult to compare across Europe due to 
national legal differences, vary hugely from the established guideline maximum 
sentences.  This paper uses these statistics sparingly, primarily to establish the case 
for paying special attention to the UK within the European drug situation. 
 
To approach drug policy analysis in a transversal or comprehensive manner is 
extremely complex and time consuming therefore it is much more common to 
research one aspect of drug policy.  When researching police cooperation in Europe 
in in the field of drug trafficking, both Elvins (2003) and Vreugdenhil (2007) 
conceptualise the process as network-driven.  Elvins approaches the issue from the 
EU level, charting the institutions and processes created for directing domestic policy 
at the EU level and claiming that the cooperation in this field is a story of success.  
Vreugdenhil approaches the issue from the national level, particularly from the Dutch 
perspective and is much more critical in his view of the effectiveness and efficiency 
of European cooperation, echoing the criticisms of Monar (2006), that national 
resistance and operational „bottlenecks‟ are a serious constraint on European 
cooperation.  Both, however, agree that the process is still in a developmental stage. 
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3. Methods & Research Design 
There has, in recent years, been something of an explosion in research and analysis 
of drugs policies, however, much of this comes in the form of either narrative 
description, lacking an analytical base, or critical analysis which veers towards 
outright advocacy, promoting one specific policy position or another in place of 
existing policy responses.  In a departure from this, this paper seeks to explain the 
interaction between domestic policies and the EU, using the analytical tools 
developed by Europeanization scholarship and, rather than seeking to promote one 
policy over another, it will seek to better understand the dynamics of European 
integration on domestic politics.   
 
In this section I will explain the methods chosen for analysis, the data selected and 
how this fits into the research questions I have posed.  Firstly, I will discuss how the 
complexity, inherent in this field, is to be dealt with by the use of the case study 
method and how this will impact on the chosen analytical approach of 
Europeanization.  Secondly, I will discuss the case choice, its context within the 
larger European drug situation and justify the UK as an example worthy of special 
consideration in this area. 
 
3.1 - Engaging with complexity: the case study method 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, drug policies are incredibly complex concepts and 
have proven particularly difficult to analyse with any rigorous scientific or analytical 
approach.  This is in large part because drug policies cut across such a wide variety 
of policy areas, institutions and government ministries.  Not only is reliable data 
particularly hard to come by but it is also very difficult to associate specific policy 
interventions, outputs or instruments to any single actor or group of actors.  The 
EMCDDA has previously conducted a study into the many possible configurations 
and models of drug policy coordination across Europe (EMCDDA, 2001) and 
produced at least three basic models of policy coordination.  These coordination 
models are invariably flexible and impermanent as they are subject to frequent 
changes and modifications for a variety of political reasons, not least due to elections 
and changes in political power.  One detailed example from the UK, which shows the 
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complexity of drug policy coordination, comes from the first UK Drug Policy (UK 
Government, 1994), whereby a high-level committee for the coordination of drugs 
policy is established.  This committee was made up of the following members: 
Lord President of the Council of Ministers 
Solicitor General 
Minister of State, Home Office 
Paymaster General 
Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence 
Minister of State, Department of the Environment 
Minister of State, Scottish Office 
Minister of State, Department for Education 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Welsh Office 
In this brief snapshot of time, representing one political moment in 1994-5, 11 
different government departments were simultaneously involved in the creation and 
administration of policy in the area of illicit drugs.  Similar situations occur 
throughout the world, and particularly within the EU, resulting in incredibly complex 
configurations of policy networks.  These arrangements make the allocation of 
resources, the coordination of policy and the attribution of outcomes to actions 
particularly difficult for policy practitioners and policy analysts alike. 
 
One method used by many in the field of drug policy analysis has been to try and 
simplify these arrangements.  Artificial and analytical boundaries have been created 
by academics and practitioners in order to better understand these complex 
relationships.  One of the most enduring has been to establish a difference between 
'demand reduction' and 'supply reduction', with a third horizontal term, added in 
relatively recent times, 'harm reduction'.  Figure 1 demonstrates typical analytical 
divisions created to better understand drug policy.  Demand reduction responses are 
those policies and actions which seek to reduce the number of people wanting to take 
drugs, these includes prevention programmes, drug treatment and, by extension, are 
linked to harm reduction methods such as syringe exchange and injection rooms.  
Supply reduction responses are those policies that seek to reduce the availability of 
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drugs in a particular location.  These responses are typically, although not 
exclusively, linked to law enforcement agencies and the criminal justice system.  
Harm reduction as a concept has recently, and controversially, been increasingly used 
in terms of supply reduction (Elvins, 2008) in the context of developing law 
enforcement strategies that better focus resources on drugs and activities that do the 
most harm. 
 
Figure 1 – A Typical Demand Reduction/Supply Reduction Model 
 
 Demand reduction Supply reduction 
Responsible 
departments/actors 
Department of Health; 
Department of Education; 
NGOs 
Department of Interior; 
Department of Defence; 
Department of Finances 
(Customs) 
Typical 
responses/policy 
measures 
Prevention campaigns; 
Drug treatment & rehabilitation 
Drug seizures; 
Arrests 
Policy indicators Number of users in treatment; 
Treatment responses 
 
Number of 
arrests/offenders/convictions 
Quantities of drugs seized 
Purity of drugs seized 
Harm reduction 
responses 
Syringe exchange 
Injection rooms 
Community policing 
 
 
It is important for researchers in the drug field to remember that whilst these 
divisions do serve an analytical purpose, in allowing policies and networks to be 
examined in greater detail, without the 'noise' of competing actors, institutions and 
policies, in practice there is a great deal of confusion in the running of policies.  As 
Reuter (2009) points out, one of the most difficult things to take into account in drug 
policy analysis is the unintended consequences.  It is argued that health and demand 
reduction responses will undoubtedly have an effect of supply reduction and law 
enforcement and vice versa.  Interventions such as mandatory, Court enforced 
treatment regimens are one specific example of a policy response that would be hard 
to place in a classical 'supply reduction/demand reduction' analysis. 
 
The simplification of drug policies into demand reduction, with largely health based 
responses, and supply reduction, with its largely law enforcement based responses, 
has had the consequence of over simplifying the analysis and debate around these 
policies.  One of the most common approaches to viewing drug policies has been to 
place national responses somewhere on a one dimensional scale between liberal and 
repressive.  This has allowed some countries, notably the Netherlands and, more 
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recently, Portugal (Greenwald, 2009), on the liberal side to be held up as cases of 
best practice to other countries with more punitive policies, often the USA but also 
the UK and Sweden (Chatwin, 2003).  Two fundamental flaws with these studies is 
that frequently they fail to take into account the complexity both of national context 
and the policy field itself, instead focussing on a small number of policy outcomes or 
legislation, the resulting analysis does not sufficiently establish causal mechanisms. 
 
There have recently been moves away from this over-simplistic approach and drug 
policy analysts are increasingly engaging with the complexity of the subject by 
developing case study analyses with cases taken either from a specific manifestation 
of the drug phenomenon (Zobel & Götz, 2011) or else a narrow but deep 
examination of a specific country (EMCDDA, 2011).  The case study offers a 
particularly useful method of examining drugs policy, which, we have to bear in 
mind, is comparatively uniform across most countries, specifically EU countries.  
The three UN conventions that comprise the international drug control regime 
compel signatories to prohibit the possession of scheduled drugs and to take 
measures to punish offenders.  These articles have been fully incorporated within the 
acquis communitaire and so much of the flexibility of the EU MS lies with their 
interpretation and their cooperation with each other. 
 
The case-study approach has both strengths and weaknesses as a method for political 
analysis.  Critics often point to the highly contextualised nature of cases, the limited 
possibilities for generalisation and the risks of verification bias as some of the 
primary weaknesses of the case-study (Flyvbjerg, 2004).  Rather than considering 
these issues as limitations it is more productive to view them, as Gerring (2004) 
argues, as trade-offs.  This paper will not seek to generate causal inferences which 
can be used to generalise across cases, but rather detail descriptive inferences.  
Instead of testing theoretical presuppositions this paper will seek to generate and 
build upon theoretical mechanisms that drive informal and complex interactions 
between actors. 
 
As Europeanization specifically seeks to understand domestic change and often seeks 
to explain differentiated integration (Héretier et al, 2001) it is very important to 
consider national context in each case.  Both the domestic political context as well as 
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national patterns of drug use are going to have a large impact on the shape of drug 
policy and how it is effected by European norms.  Because the case-study method 
takes a deep look rather than a broad analysis these considerations can already be 
taken into account and factored into the analysis.  Rather than seeking to generalise 
over a large number of cases a small-n case study allows an in depth understanding 
of a particular manifestation of Europeanization under certain conditions and 
constraints. 
 
The two points of analysis in this paper will be the EU and the UK, and it will be 
seeking to better understand how domestic preferences are fed in to the EU level and 
the impact of the EU‟s policies on the UK.  It could be argued, from a „top-down‟ 
perspective, that the EU provides the framework within which the MS actors operate, 
however, this paper intentionally seeks not to overstructuralise this relationship in 
such a linear fashion, instead concentrating on the creation of collective strategic 
contexts and the interaction between individual strategic actors (Hay, 2002: p131), 
therefore creating a self-sustaining policy cycle.  Whilst the EU may not be 
structurally or functionally equal to the UK in terms of its decision-making ability, 
this paper will present it as a strategically significant mediator of national 
preferences and will seek to investigate the impact and the constraints placed upon 
national actors generated by policies and politics coming from the EU. 
 
Such an analytical perspective is beneficial to the understanding of mechanism of 
Europeanization.  Many authors have shown Europeanization processes occurring at 
an institutional level and are deeply connected with actors‟ beliefs and preferences.  
In this particular area of drug policy there is a significant lack of reliable statistical or 
quantitative data, because data collected by law enforcement agencies is often 
unscientific, meaning that is often collected without resort to basic scientific methods 
or principles, and is collected for operational reasons rather than for any deeper level 
of analysis or evaluation (EMCDDA, 2002), although a significant recent shift in this 
philosophy will be discussed later. 
 
In establishing and understanding the changes in beliefs and policy goals it is, 
therefore, important to gather data from sources as close to the actors involved as 
possible.  Policy documents, strategies and white papers, written and oral evidence to 
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committees, all demonstrate policy aims and it is important, when examining these 
sources, to take into account the intended audience, be it the general public or other 
practitioners or policy makers. The sources of data will be discussed later in this 
section. 
 
3.2 Case Selection – The UK: the 'Jekyll & Hyde' of Europe  
 
At first glance the UK would seem an unlikely choice as a case for better 
understanding processes of European integration.  The UK's involvement in the EU 
has been described as like 'Jekyll & Hyde' (Brown Pappamikail, 1998) on the one 
hand the UK publicly distances itself from the EU and European institutions, finding 
it politically beneficial at home to present a Eurosceptic approach on most matters 
regarding the EU.  This is supported by recent polls which show the UK public as 
some of the most sceptical of the benefits of the EU and the least trustful of EU 
institutions (Eurobarometer 75).  The UK's activity in private, however, in the 
meetings of the various EU institutions, committees and agencies paints a different 
picture that this paper will go on to demonstrate.  There is a growing body of work 
showing that the UK is particularly skilled at employing its 'soft' power to influence 
the direction of EU policy in line with its own domestic interests and preferences 
(Adler-Nissen, 2009; Naurin and Lindhal, 2010; Weiner, A, 1999) this has 
particularly been the case in the field of drugs where the situation in the UK 
demonstrates some of the most challenging policy problems in the EU. 
 
When choosing the case to be analysed it is of vital importance to take into account 
the context of the drug situation each state and across with wider European context.  
The drug situation in Europe varies greatly, both in scale, character and responses, 
and is described annually by the EMCDDA‟s annual report, using the latest data 
provided by the NFP of each MS.  Whilst differentiation across individual nations are 
observed, there are some general trends and models which are also evident (Zobel 
and Götz, 2011).  In terms of general drug use there seems to be some strong 
geographical patterns to the popularity of certain substances.  This is a combination 
of cultural preference as well as the ease of supply of certain substances.  Generally 
speaking trafficking of specific substances follows certain routes, large ports and 
transport hubs are always going to be attractive to drug traffickers but Western and  
24 
 
Table 1 – European Drug Statistics 
 
 Lifetime Prevelence (15-
64) 
 
Drug Law Offences (2009) Drug Seizures (yearly mean 2005-2009) 
Country Cannabis 
(%) 
Cocaine 
(%) 
Use Related Supply 
Related 
Cannabis 
Resin (kg) 
Cannabis Herbal 
(kg) 
Cocaine (kg) 
Belgium 14.3 : 26655 13608 19121.8 6351.4 4820.2 
Bulgaria 7.3 1.7 2767 830 16.4 886.4 107.2 
Czech Republic 27.6 1.5 285 2044 3.9 179.6 14.8 
Denmark 32.5 4.4 : : 1643.8 178.0 69.8 
Germany 25.6 3.3 169689 50965 4554.8 4593.6 1490.0 
Estonia : : 3452 789 95.4 13.0 13.2 
Ireland 21.9 5.3 : : 3965.8 546.0 495.0 
Greece 8.9 0.7 : : 2079.2 7843.0 209.6 
Spain 32.1 10.2 372230 25390 581971.0 1566.6 37838.6 
France 30.6 2.6 137594 9299 62539.0 3360.6 7071.6 
Italy 32.0 7.0 36731 23187 23410.2 4380.8 4229.6 
Cyprus 11.6 3.0 560 162 27.5 175.4 6.0 
Latvia 12.1 2.3 3267 815 2.1 22.0 3.82 
Lithuania 11.9 0.5 1313 832 44.0 112.8 10.4 
Luxembourg : : 1081 141 3.8 25.6 3.0 
Hungary 8.5 0.9 4048 655 9.4 264.6 14.6 
Malta 3.5 0.4 462 161 27.8 115.3 11.0 
Netherlands 22.6 3.4 : 10303 6683.3 5490.0 11900.0 
Austria 14.2 2.2 19735 2066 185.0 817.8 103.2 
Poland 9.0 0.8 46123 20829 43.8 471.6 69.2 
Portugal 11.7 1.9 7549 2615 32731.6 1097.6 13499.6 
Romania 1.5 0.1 : : 20.4 797.4 290.8 
Slovenia : : 3244 976 1.4 292.8 28.4 
Slovakia 16.1 1.2 620 433 0.5 74.8 77.5 
Finland 14.3 1.1 11268 923 312.2 53.6 3.6 
Sweden 14.3 3.3 33640 3707 1154.6 265.0 314.4 
United Kingdom 30.2 7.7 99861 27515 27314.4 23689.6 3241.6 
Source: EMCDDA Statistical Bulletin 2011 
 
Southern Europe are particularly popular for Cocaine which is typically grown and 
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produced in the Andean region of South America and comes to Europe directly or 
through the Caribbean or West Africa (EMCDDA, 2010; Europol, 2009; Zaitch, 
2003).  As shown in Table 1 below the highest seizures of cocaine along with the 
highest lifetime prevalence follow this general geographical pattern.  In each column 
of Table 1 the top five in each variable are highlighted.  In Eastern Europe and 
Scandinavia the more popular stimulants are typically synthetics, amphetamine and 
methamphetamine which are produced locally (EMCDDA, 2009; EMCDDA, 2010).  
Cannabis is highly prevalent throughout Europe but here the divide is typically 
between cannabis resin, largely produced in North Africa and popular in Southern 
Europe, and herbal cannabis, increasingly produced within the EU and more popular 
in Northern Europe. 
 
As Table 1 demonstrates the UK is near the top of the rankings in a number of drug 
indicators.  Its level of Cannabis use is 5th in the EU, 30.2% of UK citizens aged 15-
64 had used cannabis at least once in their life.  Cocaine use is 2nd in the EU with a 
lifetime prevalence of 7.7%.  In terms of drug crime the UK is also near the top in a 
number of variables: in 2009 the UK had the 4th highest number of use related drug 
offences recorded and the 2nd highest number of supply related offences.  As seizure 
figures can be distorted due to a small number of large seizures or because of 
operational priorities, a more accurate measure is an average over a period of time.  
Between 2005 and 2009, UK law enforcement seized on average 27,314.4kg of 
cannabis resin (5th in the EU) and 23,689.6kg of herbal cannabis (1st in the EU) as 
well as 3,241.6kg of cocaine (7th in the EU).  These figures show that the UK is a 
primary drug destination within the EU and provides a large percentage of the market 
share for drug dealers.  Often drugs intercepted in Spain, Portugal, Belgium and the 
Netherlands, typical drug transit countries, have been discovered destined for the UK 
market, and there exist networks of criminals in continental Europe with close links 
to UK criminals (SOCA, 2011). 
 
Such a significant drug problem has prompted a wave of research and the UK is 
home to a number of well-respected research institutes and Non-Governmental 
Organizations which specialize in drug research.  DrugScope, Transform Drug Policy 
Foundation and the Institute of Criminal Policy Research are just a number of the 
research groups that regularly publish work in this area.  UK researchers also 
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contribute significantly to international drug research and play prominent roles in 
international drug research networks. The UK provides the second biggest 
contribution, after Spain, to the Exchange on Drug Demand Reduction Action 
(EDDRA), a European database of evaluated best practice programmes (EMCDDA, 
2008: 31).  The UK has been a member of the Reitox network, Europe‟s network of 
national drug research units, since its inception in 1993 and is one of the most well 
established and productive National Focal Points (NFP) in the EMCDDA's network, 
both in terms of the quantity and level of involvement and the quality and innovation 
of its research.  In addition to its annual reporting obligations, the UK has 
contributed to every edition of the EMCDDA Selected Issue publication series, 
where specific contemporary key issues are analysed, as well as the full range of 
other publications such as Monographs, Insights and Thematic Papers.  In addition, 
the UK is seen to lead the field in terms of its policy evaluation and its innovative 
approach to assessing drug harms (Nutt et al, 2007).  This paper will make much use 
of this growing body of scientific work, nevertheless a large part if it undoubtedly 
focuses on policy outcomes and visible indicators and the work on the formation of 
policy, particularly in the context of the EU, is much harder to find.  The last section 
will examine the nature of the sources which will be used in this paper. 
 
3.3 Data and Sources 
 
Many of the weaknesses and data gaps in drug supply reduction data have already 
been discussed and have been frequent matters of concern to policy analysts working 
in the area, not least those who seek to compare different states or systems 
(EMCDDA, 2002).  When studying the UK and its own particular policies there is an 
additional problem in the nature of the UK political system.  The unique constitution 
and political system of the UK has encouraged strong administrative regionalism.  
Devolution, as well as separate legal systems, has resulted in individual drug policies 
for England & Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.  The drug problems in the 
different constituent countries of the UK also varies greatly, with lifetime prevalence 
levels for cannabis use in adult males ranging from 23.7% in Northern Ireland to 
36.7% in England & Wales (EMCDDA, 2011).  Despite this difficult administrative 
terrain this paper seeks to examine the UK as a whole because the majority of polices 
and resources, particularly the relationship of institutions and policies with the EU, 
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are decided centrally by the Westminster government.  Where policies, responses or 
other institutional arrangements are specific to a certain region or country then this 
will be made explicit in the analysis. 
 
Aside from the data produced on an annual basis by the UK NFP, and published by 
both the UK Government and the EMCDDA, there is a high amount of textual data 
that is rarely examined in a policy analysis context.  It is widely known how much of 
each drug is seized by UK Customs every year and how many people are convicted 
of a drug crime each year but it is a little more difficult to establish more subtle 
policy goals such as why the UK may focus its resources on cocaine one year and the 
next year on heroin.  The UK‟s policy goals and preferences when considering 
international cooperation and the EU are particularly difficult to establish and so 
answers to questions such as why UK law enforcement would seek a greater 
involvement with Europol and seek the help of Eurojust in obtaining more European 
Arrest Warrants must be found in sources closer to the policy actors.  The UK was 
one of the first European countries to publish a comprehensive drug policy (UK 
Government, 1994) and this was accompanied by a great deal of additional policy 
documents such as research and consultation papers.  Strategy documents, such as a 
published Drug Strategy or Drug Action, typically constrain actors by assigning 
resources towards the completion of certain specified policy aims and goals.  In 
recent years these documents have become increasingly sophisticated, often with 
more specific policy indicators, timescales and responsible parties. 
 
Part of the system of oversight of the UK Parliament is the establishment of Select 
Committees.  Both the House of Commons and the House of Lords have committees 
and are made up of MPs or Lords from all political parties.  The purpose of these 
committees is to provide information, advice and criticism on current and future 
government policies and to do this they have the power to call and cross examine 
expert witnesses and receive statements and data from a wide variety of government 
departments and agencies. 
 
Two of the most important committees, for the purpose of this paper, are the House 
of Commons‟ Home Affairs Committee and the House of Lords Committee on 
European Affairs.  Both these committees have produced detailed reports on the 
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UK‟s drug policy and particularly on issues of international cooperation and the 
impact of Europol on the UK‟s law enforcement system and legislation.  Both the 
written and oral evidence of experts and government departments are used to write 
reports outlining the current situation and making policy recommendations 
accordingly.  The evidence provided to the committees, because of the nature of 
cross examination, is often extremely insightful and offer a particularly productive 
way of understanding the policy goals of government as well as institutional change 
in certain governmental organizations.  These committees allow analysts to draw a 
great deal of evidence on both the logics of appropriateness of policy practitioners, at 
all levels, and also what they believe the consequences of policy will be. 
 
In addition to the UK Drug Strategies, a great deal of information can be taken from 
the EU‟s policy documents.  The EU has been producing Strategies and Action Plans 
in the fight against illicit drugs since 1990, although the first comprehensive strategy 
document to be complimented with action plans came in 1994 and covered the years 
1995-1999.  After this period there was a further assessment exercise which resulted 
in the publication of a document called EU Baseline 1999 (European Commission, 
1999).  These documents set out the aims, priorities and policies to be followed over 
a set period of time, usually five years.  In constraining and shaping the policy 
options for MS these documents can be seen as tools based on the logic of 
appropriateness, because for their duration they set out, in increasingly specific 
terms, the appropriate action to be taken by MS in the field of drugs policy.  During 
the effective period of each Drug Strategy, MS action is constrained by the actions 
agreed to and set forth in the document.  It is not a case that MS are limited to solely 
undertake actions in the Strategy, leaving no room for unilateral or bilateral action, 
however, as all actions have been previously agreed for mutual benefit, any actions 
which specifically and openly run contrary to the spirit and aims of the Strategy 
would be noted and be seen to be deviant behavior.   
 
In the course of the next two sections, therefore, a number of textual sources will be 
used in order to better understand the goals, aims and preferences that compete in 
drug strategies in Europe and how these help us better understand Europeanization 
processes.  This paper will seek to first present the form in which mediated MS 
preferences have taken in the EU, its agencies and institutions.  These then provide 
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policy goals and logics of appropriateness within policy networks at the international 
and domestic level.  The second part will focus on the UK and how domestic actors 
and institutions there have projected and incorporated their national preferences into 
a great European policy and the impact this policy has had on domestic institutions. 
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4.  Joint European Action in Supply Reduction and the EU’s Impact 
Before 1992, joint European action in the field of drugs was largely in the hands of a 
few, often secretive, expert-led networks made up of senior law enforcement 
officials, civil servants and political elites.  There was a consensus that decision-
making related to drug control should be intergovernmental and based on the advice 
and information of law enforcement actors.  Three documents fundamentally altered 
this situation and paved the way for an independently acting EU to play a greater role 
in national and international policy, the Schengen Accord in 1985, the Single 
European Act (SEA) in 1987, and the Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed in 
1992 in Maastricht.  Much has been written on the effect of these instruments on the 
issues of European integration and state sovereignty, which does not bear repeating 
again here, although the first part of this section will briefly describe their 
importance with regards to the introduction of illicit drug control into the EU policy 
portfolio. 
The first part of this section, therefore, will describe joint European instruments and 
actions in the field of drugs before 1992, a period where the foundations for deeper 
integration were laid.  The second section will describe the period between 1992 and 
1999, a time in which the high hopes for joint action and cooperation, at the outset, 
were quickly tempered.  This period saw not only the creation of two EU agencies 
working in the drugs policy field but also the first Commission authored EU drug 
action plan which ran from 1995-1999.  The third section will cover the period 2000-
2008, a period of reflection and re-evaluation of the overarching aims and 
possibilities of European joint action in drug control.  During this time the second 
European drug action plan was launched (2000-2005), followed by the first 
coordinated drug strategy (2005-2012) which was combined with two concurrent 
drug action plans (2005-2008 & 2009-2012).  The final section will look at some of 
the lessons drawn from these important policy documents as well as looking forward 
to future trends in European drug policy. 
4.1 - Pre-1992: The foundations of EU involvement 
The 1957 Treaty of Rome provided a legal basis for joint European action in the field 
of drugs, giving what was to become the EU a decision-making role in the spheres of 
public health, trade control of chemical precursors and cooperation in development 
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(European External Action Service, 2002).  Until 1992 the topic of drugs remained a 
low priority, behind economic integration, and it was not until 1969, at the initiative 
of the French President, Georges Pompidou, that drugs moved onto the policy 
agenda.  Even then, the first steps were taken outside of the formal EEC framework.  
In 1971 an intergovernmental organization bearing his name, the Pompidou Group 
(PG), was created.  Originally the PG comprised the six members of the EEC at the 
time (France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Luxembourg) plus the UK, 
whose EEC accession talks were advanced.  By 1980 the group was integrated into 
the framework of the Council of Europe (Council of Europe, 1980a) which was a 
purely intergovernmental organization, emphasising the supremacy of national 
decision-making in this area.   
The initial brief of the PG was multidisciplinary, to study health and prevention as 
well as law enforcement related issues. One of its most important impacts was 
providing a forum for national law enforcement experts to meet and exchange 
experiences and knowledge.  This forum existed at a technical level and allowed the 
idea of shared European policy problems to develop.  Amongst the topics discussed 
frequently in the PG was information and intelligence exchange, comparative 
repressive measures in drug control and the harmonization of national legislation.  
Perhaps the best example of this technical discussion group is the PG Airports 
Group, an annual meeting of law enforcement and customs officials whose role is the 
exchange of operational information and trends in the detection of drugs seized at 
airports. 
By 1985 the EEC was facing new political challenges in response to the discussions 
surrounding the Schengen Accord and the SEA.  It was feared that the free 
movement of people and goods, envisaged in the Single Market, could be exploited 
by organized criminals to facilitate illicit trafficking.  At this time the EEC already 
had an organized crime and terrorism taskforce, TREVI, which had been established 
in 1975.  In 1985 a new working group (WG III) was added to the TTEVI framework 
bringing drugs into their policy portfolio.  Like PG, TREVI was intergovernmental in 
structure, being linked to the European Council.  It operated on three decision-
making levels, at the highest was the ministerial level and, below this, the senior 
official level.  These groups met every six months to sign off on decisions most often 
made at the lowest level, the working groups or technical level.  The working group 
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level was made up of national experts and senior national law enforcement officials 
(Elvins, 2003, p86). 
The impact in practical or operational terms, of both PG and Trevi on European 
cooperation, was limited and their functioning was largely at working group level, 
maintaining a distance between the technical experts and the upper level of decision-
makers.  Their reports were rarely published
7
 or widely disseminated.  Despite this, 
their influence lay in their legitimacy as national law enforcement experts and their 
ability to exchange experience and influence without consideration to national 
political pressures or preferences.  Politicians and policy makers who did have 
decision-making powers frequently followed the direction of these groups as the 
technical expertise added legitimacy to their own decisions and it was recognised 
that these working groups had the broadest and most comprehensive information 
available on the issue.  Perhaps the greatest impact of these groups was the way in 
which they managed to embed the principle that, as Elvins (2003, p82) puts it, 
“…policy design of this form should be delegated in the first instance to functional-
technical actors to establish both strategic rationale and parameters for policy 
actions.” Effectively illicit drug control is a law enforcement (repressive) activity 
and policy should be left in the hands of (law-enforcement) experts and not in the 
hands of politicians or experts from other fields.  These early fora established a 
principle that information and evidence are of vital important in the development of 
drug policy, though in these cases they gave the legitimacy for the generation of 
information to law enforcement actors. 
In 1986 the European Commission was given a seat in the PG as a participatory 
member and increasingly took a lead in shaping a European policy.  Whilst the PG 
and TREVI did much to foster informal law-enforcement co-operation, national 
governments remained in overall control of national policy and there was little in the 
way of structured or coordinated action at the European level.  The creation of the 
European Committee to Combat Drugs (CELAD), in 1989, had an important impact 
in reaffirming drugs policy as a European political issue rather than simply a law 
enforcement issue.  Comprised of nominated national drug coordinators and a 
representative of the Commission, CELAD operated outside of the formal EU 
                                                          
7
 The reports of the Pompidou Group Airport Group remain confidential to this date. 
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institutional structure but reported directly to the Council (Boekhout van Solinge, 
2002, p24).  CELAD‟s main responsibility was coordinating the EU‟s drug related 
activities, emphasizing that the existing technical groups were to be only one part of 
future European joint action. 
CELAD has been criticised as producing little in concrete terms (Boekhout van 
Solinge, ibid), although as it was made up of Member-state (MS) governmental level 
officials it did provide a political legitimacy to European intervention in drug policy 
and CELAD was important in its advocacy of the ratification of the 1988 UN 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances by 
all EEC members (Elvins, 2003, p94) which went some way to the harmonisation of 
drug laws across Europe and throughout the world.  CELAD is also credited with 
two important contributions to European policy: the group was largely responsible 
for drafting the first two European drug strategies which, in turn, led directly to the 
creation of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 
(EMCDDA), the first independent European agency working in the field 
(Estievenart, 1995, pp68-71). 
The first two European drug strategies were introduced at the European Councils of 
Rome (1990) and Edinburgh (1992).  The impact of these strategies was limited due 
to the few substantive Community powers in the field of drugs, and they also lacked 
specific policy programmes, objectives or indicators to allow their evaluation.  These 
early strategies were limited to recommending specific areas of importance to the 
MS who should then implement recommendations using their own powers and 
initiative.  In terms of drug supply reduction these measures included making 
searches at external borders a priority as well as increasing cooperation in the 
surveillance of internal borders (Estievenart, ibid).  As with the outputs from PG and 
Trevi, CELAD emphasised that coordination should be at the MS level and provided 
no formal or informal mechanism for this to take place. 
Despite the lack of concrete policy objectives or goals in the first two strategies a 
movement in that direction can be observed.  The EMCDDA, the role of which was 
the gathering and dissemination of policy relevant data and information, was viewed 
as a tool to allow policies and interventions to be assessed using hard evidence in the 
future.  Many of CELAD‟s functions, especially that of providing a forum for 
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national drug coordinators, were consumed by the EMCDDA after its creation.  As 
Estievenart states CELAD was „a key factor in the political mobilisation which has 
grown in parallel throughout Europe‟ (ibid, p.61), effectively preparing the way for 
the European institutionalisation of the fight against drugs that was formalised in the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
In the pre-Maastricht era policy networks within the EU were largely informal and 
intergovernmental in nature.  Groups like PG, TREVI and CELAD had little or no 
decision-making ability but were vital in creating a shared policy space and defining 
drug trafficking as a Europe-wide problem with Europe-wide policy responses.  
These networks also formed a bridge between law enforcement actors, who had the 
technical knowledge and legitimacy, and political elites, who had the political and 
decision-making legitimacy.  MS had been enthusiastic to participate in informal 
groups but had shown reluctance to commit themselves to specific action, either 
through common legislation at the European level or through the Drug Strategies.  
This period is marked by an evolution towards more institutionalised and formal 
policy networks consisting of national experts and „technocrats‟, drawn from outside 
the traditional field of law enforcement and criminal justice, and demonstrates that 
the EU was moving in a direction whereby the production of information would 
remain in the hands of legitimate national experts but the legitimacy for the 
collection and publication of the information moves from the MS to the EU and from 
law enforcement to researchers and academics. 
4.2 – 1992-2000: Towards a modern drug policy 
The effects of the TEU on the EU‟s competence in the field of drugs cannot be 
underestimated Etievenart (1995), Boekhout van Solinge (2002) and Elvins, (2003, 
pp100-139) provide detailed accounts of the formal institutional changes during this 
period.  Lack of space prevents me going into any depth here but it is enough to 
reiterate that, as stated above, pre-Maastricht, much of the joint action in the field of 
drugs had taken place on an informal basis either outside of the EEC framework or 
between national experts who reported to intergovernmental fora.  Aside from a 
place at the table in the PG, the Commission was largely removed from decision-
making in drugs and EU policies had little impact on MS as any actions or 
suggestions from the Commission were non-binding. 
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With the adoption of the three pillar EU system, drugs policy was divided across all 
three pillars, with supply-reduction nominally falling under the intergovernmental 
Third Pillar.  Under this system, both the Commission and the newly created 
EMCDDA, still retained an influence in all drug related issues but ultimately 
decision-making ability resided with the MS.  The EMCDDA was created with, „the 
understanding that the brief of this Centre would cover not only the social and health 
aspects but also other drug-related aspects, including trafficking and repression‟ 
(Council for the European Union, 1993, p2).  In the founding regulations it is also 
made clear that the Centre existed to provide both „the Community and its Member 
States with objective, reliable and comparable information at European level 
concerning drugs and drug addiction‟, however it, „may not take any measure which 
in any way goes beyond the sphere of information and the processing thereof‟ 
(Article 1).  Whilst a role of simply producing information may appear limiting, in 
effect the EMCDDA constrains the ability of MS to evaluate and produce drug 
policy using their own evidence.  This has a major impact on the Europeanization of 
drug policy because, as argued by March and Olsen (1989), one of the fundamental 
ways in which populations hold their decision-makers to account is through 
information.  This information must be seen, both internally and externally, as 
legitimate and accurate and the EU was increasingly taking responsibility for the 
production of information that national governments could be evaluated on. 
The EMCDDA also acted as a multilevel forum for a wide variety of national drug 
experts, from practitioners and academics to policy-makers and political elites.  The 
agency was supervised at the highest level by a Management Board comprised of 
nominated MS officials as well as representatives of the Commission and European 
Parliament.  In addition to this there was also a Scientific Committee to ensure the 
standards and integrity of the work conducted and increasing the agency‟s scientific 
legitimacy.  The EMCDDA was also granted powers to arrange expert meetings and 
conduct pilot studies throughout the field of drugs and, vitally to the functioning of 
the agency, it was given some authority over a network of national focal points 
(NFP) who would gather data in their respective countries.  The EMCCDA was also 
given the task of coordinating, in conjunction with the NFP, the development of 
common indicators of the drug problem and a data collection system. 
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The EU‟s policy objective of increasing MS sharing of information in an 
independent institutional mechanism was also evident in the creation of Europol, 
initially through Article K.1(9) of the TEU.  As Fijnaut (1992, p105) and Woodward 
(1993, p12) describe, the idea of a European police force was an old one and it was 
Germany who pushed forward the idea, having in mind a force run on similar lines to 
their own federal BKA (Bundeskriminlamt), with operational and investigative 
powers throughout the Union to combat drug trafficking, participate in cross border 
chases and coordinate national police responses.  Despite the backing of the EU and 
a number of MS, the idea of an international police force with cross-border 
operational powers was heavily contested, not only at the political level by other MS, 
but also by senior police officers who felt that such an international force would 
compromise their own ability to allocate resources.  There were also criticisms that 
Europol could simply be replicating the role of Interpol in many cases and such a 
repetition would be a waste of scarce resources.  Europol‟s initial role, as defined 
originally in the annex to the TEU and later confirmed in the Europol Convention of 
1995 (Article 3) would be: 
 support for national criminal investigation and security authorities, in 
particular in the coordination of investigations and search operations;  
 creation of databases;  
 central analysis and assessment of information in order to take stock of the 
situation and identify investigative approaches;  
 collection and analysis of national prevention programmes for forwarding to 
Member States and for drawing up Europe-wide prevention strategies;  
 measures relating to further training, research, forensic matters and criminal 
records departments. 
Europol had as its first priority (Europol Convention, Article 2) the suppression of 
drug trafficking and would serve as a liaison to facilitate the flow of information 
between MS investigations.  In this initial phase it was to know known as the 
„Europol Drug Unit‟.  Staffed by seconded national law enforcement officers, the 
initial Convention did not give Europol any independent operational or investigative 
powers and the organization was reliant of the initiative and compliance of the MS.  
The office was required to produce an annual report on the work it had done in the 
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previous year and given the important function of coordinating joint training between 
national law enforcement officers. 
The creation of both the EMCDDA and Europol instituted, for the first time, 
European networks, nominally independent from the MS, for the gathering of drug 
related information.  The former would provide comparable current and historical 
data on the nature of the drug phenomenon across Europe, along with trends in use 
and current responses, and the latter would provide real-time, operational intelligence 
for the use of domestic agencies.  The future of European joint action in drugs was 
outlined in the European Action Plan to Combat Drugs (European Commission, 
1994).  The first „modern‟ European drug strategy was published in 1994 and 
covered the period 1995-1999.  It can be considered modern in the sense that it was 
comprehensive and cross-pillar, covering the whole range of drug related issues, 
including health, education and criminal policy, and was drawn up with contributions 
from actors working across a number of fields.  It is an important document because, 
firstly, it was produced at the initiative of the Commission and its focus was on 
Community action.  The contribution of all MS ensured that the final document was 
a consensual compromise but this also strengthened the power of the document.  MS 
compliance with the strategy was seen as important for maintaining trust amongst 
EU partners. 
Whilst the section of the action plan on supply-reduction defers to the responsibility 
of the MS, under Title VI TEU, for action related to police-cooperation, the emphasis 
of the document is on Community action as shown by the wording of the 
introduction (European Commission, 1994, p.iii): 
Action for the purpose of tackling the problem of trafficking in 
drugs will require action at both the level of the Community and 
in the context of the implementation of the provisions of Title VI 
of the TEU on Cooperation in the field of Justice and Home 
Affairs.  
The document gives primacy to MS whilst explicitly carving out an independent role 
for Community action, in doing so MS acknowledge the „added-value‟ of the EU in 
complimenting domestic action.  At the Community level this mainly consists of the 
„development of networks for the rapid exchange of information, training etc.‟ (ibid), 
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but there are opportunities for further cooperation envisaged even within the 
constraints of the treaty structure, „Title VI of the TEU also creates new possibilities 
for action at Union level in areas traditionally the preserve of inter-governmental 
cooperation‟ (ibid). The Commission also shares the right of initiative with the MS in 
those areas of drug policy not expressly covered by Title VI and, in the first drug 
action plan, this was manifested in the desire to create greater interdisciplinary 
groups, exchanging information and experience in both demand reduction and supply 
reduction and cementing a move away from a largely law-enforcement defined 
problem. 
Strategy documents, such as the Drug action plans, demonstrate Europeanization 
processes in drug policy.  In line with Bulmer and Radaelli‟s definition of 
Europeanization (2005), action plans explicitly demonstrate the formalisation, 
construction and institutionalisation of shared beliefs and norms, in the form of 
specific policy goals and objectives, at the European level and they shape domestic 
policy in line with this.  This is a particularly effective „soft-law‟ approach to policy 
convergence because it allows MS the opportunity to promote their own preferences 
whilst any measures that deviate too far from the majority can be vetoed.  It is also 
the case that the strategies and action plans give MS the opportunity to work on 
community goals within their own domestic political, legal and social contexts, 
thereby maintaining differentiated integration patterns. 
In terms of „hard-law‟, formal and binding legislation in the form of Regulations, 
Directives and other legal instruments, the Community was severely constrained in 
the measures it could adopt due to the primacy of the MS.  The specific area of 
supply-reduction policy in which the EU had the greatest degree of impact was in the 
trafficking of precursor chemicals.  Provisions of the SEA and TEU gave the 
Community a greater degree of initiative and decision-making power on the 
regulation of licit trade into the community, between MS and between third 
countries.  This led to a number of agreements and regulations restricting the trade in 
chemicals used in the preparation of illicit drugs between MS and third countries
8
.   
                                                          
8
 For examples see Council Regulation (EEC) 92 No 900/92 laying down measures to be taken to 
discourage the diversion of certain substances to the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances as well as Council Decisions 95/567/EC, 95/568/EC, 95/569/EC, 95/570/EC 
and 95/571/EC, regulating trade with Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. 
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Aside from customs controls in licit and regulated substances, the EU had little 
influence on MS drug legislation.  The UN conventions still provided the framework 
for control, but outside of this there was a great deal of variation both in how the 
conventions were adapted into domestic law and how those laws were implemented.  
There was an attempt with Joint Action 96/750/JHA, in 1996, to again institute better 
comparability in national law and practice.  The Action contained three main 
objectives, the approximation of laws, the closer cooperation of domestic legal 
agencies and the creation of an early warning system for new illicit drugs entering 
the market.  The early warning system is still in operation and acts as a joint project 
run by Europol and the EMCDDA.  The other objectives were prescribed in more 
vague terms and none were achieved. 
4.3 - 2000-2008: A comprehensive and concrete approach 
The first European action plan provided the first formal mechanisms for independent 
Community action in drugs at the Union level since the TEU came into force.  The 
EU would still be working under the constraint of the MS, who retained the right of 
initiative in matters related to Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), although even in this 
field the Commission could act in areas not covered by the TEU and in which it was 
felt there was a Community interest.  In order to establish this Community interest 
the Commission was aided in its work by the institutions it had previously helped 
create: the EMCDDA and Europol, whose contribution was in helping to frame 
policy problems in the context of a larger regional picture.  Whilst MS still had the 
decision-making capacity to police drug trafficking according to their own legal and 
political traditions, they were now provided with a body of evidence that 
demonstrated the importance of acting together and coordinating responses.  
A strong criticism of Community action up to 1999 was that it lacked concrete terms 
and objectives, especially in the field of supply reduction.  Actions were described 
vaguely without any objective indicators or measures of assessment.  In 2000 this 
approach changed with the publication of two complimentary documents: the 
European Union Drug Strategy (2000-2004) (Council of the European Union, 1999) 
that was produced to outline the approaches to be taken and the outcomes to be 
achieved, laid out in general terms, and this complimented by the European Action 
Plan on Drugs (2000-2004) (European Commission, 1999).  These documents were 
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produced by the Commission after consultation with the MS and the European 
agencies working in the area.  The Action Plan is an important document which, for 
the first time, links the general aims of the drug strategy to around 100 concrete tasks 
which will direct the actions of the EU and the MS. 
The Action Plan translates the aims of the strategy into individual tasks and 
designates responsible parties, either EU or MS institutions, as well as timeframes 
for completion.  A large emphasis is placed on the evaluation of policies and their 
outcomes, as demonstrated by a complimentary document, prepared jointly by the 
Commission, EMCDDA and Europol, on the implementation of the Action Plan 
(European Commission, 2001).  The document strengthens the Commission‟s role in 
the evaluation of the EU Action Plan through five key aims: 
1) proposing a progress evaluation tool; 
2) outlining evaluation methods; 
3) outlining strategies in applicant countries; 
4) reinforcing information exchange; 
5) examining ways of improving coordination. 
In the field of supply-reduction the emphasis is on the creation of joint methods for 
presenting information, including the development of a standardized method of 
recording drug seizures (p.17); MS with Europol developing crime and policy 
indicators (p. 19), and; the Commission taking a lead in establishing common 
definitions and penalties for drug trafficking (p.39).  These actions are further 
evidence of the consolidation of shared norms and „ways of doing things‟ at the 
European level and they further establish a common European approach to drug 
policy that is focused on information and evidence. 
The implementation of the Action Plan was comprehensively assessed, in accordance 
with its indicators, by both a mid-term evaluation (European Commission, 2002) and 
in a final evaluation (European Commission, 2004).  Both evaluation documents 
emphasise the achievements, at the EU level and the national level, in the more 
traditional aspects of action on supply reduction such as control and regulation of 
precursor chemicals for the manufacture of illicit drugs, the mutual recognition of 
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new synthetic substances and improved cooperation in drug-related money 
laundering.  The evaluations make it clear that joint operations in law enforcement or 
judicial action takes place largely on an informal level, or through Memoranda of 
Understanding, at the national level (European Commission, 2002, pp13) and further, 
institutionalised joint action between law enforcement agencies is encouraged, 
including greater use of instruments such as the European Arrest Warrant, 
“Mechanisms for co-operation which do exist must be made to work in practice” 
(ibid, pp14).  Such sentiments are echoed in the final evaluation which again stresses 
the need for more and better utilisation of existing formal instruments to facilitate 
law enforcement cooperation and the Commission stresses the political importance 
of better reporting of successful operations, “Further developing joint operations 
between law enforcement agencies of the Member States should be discussed. The 
establishment and results of these operations should be reported to the Council and 
the Commission” (European Commission, 2004, p9).  The adaptational pressure from 
the EU for MS to engage more in operational matters is being successfully contested 
by domestic actor coalitions, in this case law enforcement agencies.  As a strategy to 
gain a greater domestic impact, the Commission recognises the importance of 
information through promoting successful cooperation and in encouraging a stronger 
commitment to European action as being of „added-value‟ to domestic actors, which 
in turn will ease the process of transferring European norms to the domestic level. 
The creation of stronger policy networks amongst law enforcement personnel was 
falling behind progress made in other areas and had been an area of concern since the 
Tampere Council in 1999.  One reason for this was that Europol remained an 
institution separate from the day to day working of most police officers and there 
was still little trust placed in it by higher ranking officers and politicians.  One 
solution from the EU was the creation of The European Police College (CEPOL), 
established after recommendations in the conclusions of the Tampere Council and a 
European Agency from 2005.  This training institute provided an institution for the 
exchange of experience and techniques amongst European law enforcement officers 
and encourage cooperation through facilitated communication.    
One of the most important results of the evaluation of the 2000-2004 Action Plan 
was the way in which it directly influenced the drafting of a new, long-term 
European strategy.  This consisted of a Drug Strategy for 2005-2012 which would be 
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divided into two Action Plans, the first covering the years 2005-2008 and the second 
2009-2012.  Again both Action Plans were drawn up by the Commission with 
support from the EMCDDA and Europol (European Commission, 2005: p3) and 
each of which would take part in the evaluation process.  The basic structure of the 
2005 Action Plan followed previous documents, dividing actions into five sections: 
Coordination; Demand Reduction; Supply Reduction; International Cooperation, 
and; Information, Research and Analysis.  As can be seen in Annex A, these 
documents provided very detailed tasks, indicators and also the responsible parties 
for each action are clearly labelled.  
Of the 14 specific explicit supply reduction actions in the 2005-2008 Action Plan, 12 
have either the Commission or a European agency (EMCDDA, Europol, Eurojust or 
CEPOL) as a responsible party
9
.  The only actions in which MS are the sole 
responsible parties are those which involve action with third countries (Actions 28.1 
& 28.2), these being explicitly second pillar, or Common Foreign and Security 
Policy areas, and entirely intergovernmental in governance.  The Commission‟s 
increased role in shaping policy decisions is also demonstrated by the number of 
studies, pilot schemes and reports it is either commissioning or authoring (Actions 
18, 20, 21, 22, 23 & 25.2).  These cover sensitive issues such as exploring the 
possibility of establishing a fund for confiscated assets to finance joint operations, 
which demonstrates a goal on the part of the EU to be financially independent in this 
area. One of the most effective methods of control and persuasion MS have over EU 
agencies is their resourcing and budgetary oversight.  This is still an issue of great 
contention and developing alternative funding sources is one strategy the EU has 
attempted.  
The EU action plans of this period point to an increased involvement of the European 
Commission in the formation of a formal and distinctive European drug policy.  
They establish clear policy goals, linked to precise actions, that emphasis the value of 
coordinating national action with community action.  They also seek to create a 
better body of information and evidence through which indicators for policy 
evaluation at the domestic and European level can be established.   It is still evident, 
in this period, that there is a difference in specificity of actions, in the field of supply 
                                                          
9
 See Annex A for the supply reduction sections of the previous two EU Drug Action Plans. 
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reduction, when compared to demand reduction and also the evaluations point to 
more modest success in the former.  The action plans indicate that MS use of 
European instruments to facilitate law enforcement cooperation was still a cause for 
concern and that most operations took place in an informal or ad hoc manner.   
MS trust in organizations such as Europol was still low and Europol was far from 
taking any form of operational role.  This was further demonstrated by the creation, 
in 2006, of the Maritime Analysis Operations Centre – Narcotics (MAOC-N) in 
Lisbon, Portugal.  MAOC-N is an intergovernmental taskforce aimed at coordinating 
the naval and law enforcement forces of member countries in the apprehension of 
drug traffickers in the Atlantic and it operates on a multilateral institutional basis 
outside of formal EU institutional arrangements.  The original participating states 
were Portugal, Spain, the UK, France, Ireland, Netherlands, and Italy and the Centre 
circumnavigated the control structures and frameworks of Europol.  Despite this the 
Commission was outwardly supportive of the Centre, 
“While full-heartedly supporting the setting up of MAOC-N, we should 
not lose sight of the need for overall coherence of maritime law 
enforcement developments and notably coherence of MAOC-N with 
Europol activities. In the medium term, synergies and close cooperation 
of regional law enforcement initiatives with Europol are essential.”10 
MS were equally reluctant to make regular use of EU judicial instruments such as 
Eurojust.  Eurojust is an EU agency, established in 2002, as a centre for judicial and 
legal cooperation in the EU.  Between 2004 and 2008 the number of Drug 
Trafficking cases recorded by Eurojust grew from 77 to 198 (European Commission, 
2009, pp49).  Whilst this doubling of cases opened is undoubtedly a positive sign, to 
put these figures in context in 2004 the England & Wales alone sentenced 1020 
offenders for drug importation or export (Mwenda, 2005, pp6).  The distribution of 
cases amongst the MS is also uneven, with Italy, France, the Netherlands and 
Germany making 81, 72, 71 and 65 requests respectively, compared with the UK, 
                                                          
10
 Taken from a speech made by the Director General for the European Commission for Justice & 
Home Affairs recovered from http://www.mj.gov.pt/sections/documentos-e-publicacoes/doc-e-pub-
2/speech-director-general/downloadFile/file/Speech-
_Director_General_of_the_European_Comissions_Justice_Freedmom_and_Security.pdf?nocache=11
91325110.51 
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Belgium and Spain (who together make some of the largest seizures in the EU), 
made 42, 19 and 18 requests respectively (European Commission, 2009, pp52).  The 
reluctance of MS to engage in operational cooperation at the level anticipated by the 
EU shows that, in this aspect at least, Europeanization processes have stalled.  
Contestation at the domestic level, by actor coalitions, has resulted in an 
underutilisation of European instruments which, in turn, has prevented those 
institutions from gaining trust and legitimacy. 
In terms of legal instruments developed by the EU, in the period 2004-2008, perhaps 
the most important was the Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA of 25 
October 2004, laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements of 
criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking.  As mentioned 
previously, hard law in the area of supply reduction was rare and, where it existed, it 
usually coincided with other, well established, areas of community competence such 
as customs or trade control in which the EU had the power of initiative.  Previous 
attempts at legal harmonisation across the EU had also faced domestic opposition 
and the remaining legal framework was that established by the UN conventions.   
Existing political, cultural and legal traditions in the MS had allowed subtly different 
interpretations of the UN conventions to create a varied legal landscape across the 
Union.  This Council Framework Decision was something of a concession to those 
seeking better legal coordination at the European level which would facilitate the 
operation of Eurojust and other European legal instruments.  The first section of the 
Decision which outlines „the constituent elements‟ of various offences, merely 
incorporates the wording of the UN Convention of 1988 into EU law (Article 2).  
The section on specific criminal penalties (Article 3) requires MS to punish 
traffickers with „a maximum sentence of at least between 1 and 3 years‟ and serious 
traffickers with „a maximum sentence of at least between 5 or 10 years‟. The 
decision does not, however, closely define „seriousness‟ merely making reference to 
large quantities of drugs and their respective harms but leaving it to MS to better 
define these as appropriate to their existing criminal law.  MS are also given the 
freedom to reduce these penalties according to a number of mitigating factors listed 
in Article 5, all of which contribute to an increased flexibility in interpretation for 
MS and a lowering of the harmonisation effect. 
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When the Commission came to assess the implementation of the Framework 
Decision, the authors of the report emphasized the lack of progress made by MS and 
also highlighted the issue that there are regularly discrepancies between legislation 
(in this context maximum sentences) and institutional practice (European 
Commission, 2009a, pp4).  The conclusions to the report are explicit and frank in 
their assessment of the impact of this Framework Decision on domestic provisions, 
“There has been little progress in the alignment of national measures in the fight 
against drug trafficking” (p.10). 
Hard law and formal instruments of operational cooperation at the EU level have so 
far had little impact on domestic drug policies.  MS retain enough decision-making 
power and flexibility in practice to put their own domestic preferences ahead of EU 
policies and the EU has not had the power to make its actions in this area binding.  
The EU has failed to dismantle existing domestic policies and institutions and, as a 
result, these compete on an operational level in the area of law enforcement.  
Appropriate action at the domestic level is still dictated by domestic policy as this is 
the source of resources, both in terms of financial resources and, specific and 
fundamental to law enforcement, knowledge and intelligence.  The EU had a greater 
degree of success in the area of facilitated communication and the institutionalisation 
of policy networks.  Although Europol‟s actions on the operational level have been 
weak, its establishment as a source of intelligence and information in the period grew 
and the EU goal of increasing its information base also grew. 
4.4 – 2008-present: Beyond the comprehensive approach 
The most recent period has been marked by sustained MS distrust in the European 
institutions created to facilitate cooperation and coordination of supply reduction 
policy and activities at the operational level.  Europol‟s original function, as forum 
for MS law enforcement to share intelligence and operational information, remains 
underused, largely due to MS wishing to retain control over this type of information, 
as reported to the European Commission (European Commission, 2009b, p16): 
56. There are however a number of issues to overcome before all MS are 
prepared to share operational intelligence with Europol, such as 
reservations due to security concerns, ownership, primacy and the 
understandable reluctance to share live-time operational intelligence. 
46 
 
Divergent MS preferences have also resulted in the day to day running of Europol 
being compromised in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.  Since its founding 
Europol had concentrated its limited resources on what it viewed as „high value‟ 
crimes, which in terms of drugs had consisted of trafficking in cocaine, heroin and 
synthetic drugs, but due to the insistence of a number of MS this has recently been 
expanded.  In 2010, it was discussed at the highest level to introduce cannabis to 
Europol‟s competencies but within this expansion there emerged two distinct camps, 
Spain and France heading one, who believed that trafficking in cannabis resin 
(hashish) should take precedent and another group, with the UK and Netherlands 
prominent, who argued that the increased cultivation of herbal cannabis should be a 
priority.  In the event two „Analysis Work Files‟ (the standard analytical component 
of Europol‟s work) on cannabis were opened11 meaning that scarce Europol 
resources are now divided.  This incident demonstrates the conflict of national 
preferences that such organizations must deal with on a regular basis.  
Europol has also seen the nature of its role change since its inception as the Europol 
Drug Unit.  From 1
st
 January 2010 Europol has operated as an independent EU 
Agency, although empirical analysis of the institutional frameworks has shown 
Europol to be one of the least independent of the 29 EU agencies (Wonka & 
Rittberger, 2010), it is recognised that the indicators used in this study alone are not a 
sufficient measure of independence of action.  Agencification does allow a degree of 
autonomy in terms of resources and staffing, as well as in the drafting of strategic 
documents and this change represents a further severing of the ties between Europol 
and the MS.  Zito (2009) argues that EU agencies are particularly useful laboratories 
for policy learning and movement would also confirm the argument of Majone who 
states that agencification, specifically the move to agencies producing information 
rather than hard regulation, has proven successful in impacting on MS activities in 
particular areas (Majone, 1997).  Further to this, the operational and investigative 
aspects of Europol have been reduced with the emphasis being more firmly placed on 
Europol as a focal point and disseminator of criminal information and intelligence to 
other MS law enforcement agencies. 
                                                          
11 Europol‟s new interest in Cannabis was reported in the EMCDDA Annual Report for 2010 
(EMCDDA, 2010a, pp36), however the author was informed of the MS preferences by a European 
official present at the meetings. 
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Europol‟s role as an information producer rather than an information user has been 
an important change in the recent years, in response to sustained MS constraints on 
operational duties.  Europol‟s work is now not published in the form of a yearly 
activity report, accounting for actions ex post, but rather providing an annual „risk 
assessment‟ of the situation in Europe, monitoring emerging criminal trends and 
responses (Europol, 2009).  This changes the focus of the agency from a responsive 
one to a pro-active and agenda setting one which also provides Europol with greater 
independence from the MS by giving it legitimacy as a source of criminal 
intelligence.  Europol has also been increasingly collaborative with other agencies 
including the EMCDDA, publishing joint reports and taking part in a numbers of 
expert meetings, including a joint publication series with the EMCDDA on European 
perspectives on the global drugs trade (EMCDDA/Europol, 2009; 
EMCDDA/Europol, 2010).  These efforts have more successfully integrated the 
world of law enforcement with the scientific community where the methods and 
experience of both can be exchanged and, whilst academics and researchers gain 
deeper insights into this field of the drug phenomenon, law enforcement agencies 
increasingly see the importance of scientific research and data. 
The 2009-2012 Drugs Action Plan has emphasized this movement towards 
information gathering by including the task,  
To develop key-indicators for the collection of policy-relevant data on 
drug-related crime, illegal cultivation, drug markets and supply 
reduction interventions and to develop a strategy to collect them. 
(European Commission, 2009, p18) 
There is a concerted effort on the part of the EU, to increase the information on drugs 
made regularly available to the public and policy makers, and for this to include not 
only data on health and social responses, already covered by the EMCDDA, but to 
add reliable and comparable data on crime and the responses to crime.  In 2010 the 
first conference to discuss the issues in the gathering of scientifically rigorous data 
on drug supply and supply-reduction, was held in Brussels.  Between the 20
th
-22
nd
 
October, the EMCDDA organised, „The First European Conference on Drug Supply 
Indicators.‟  The conference was attended by a mixture of academics and police 
officers from throughout Europe.  The conclusions of the conference pointed to the 
48 
 
need for better coordination between law enforcement agencies and academics in the 
gathering and analysis of data but also stressed the difficulties of such data gathering 
and the extremely early stage of the state of the art (EMCDDA, 2010b). 
EU involvement in drug supply appears to have undergone a radical change, since 
the early days of the late 1980s, in which there were high hopes of close cooperation 
between MS.  The nature of this cooperation was to have included the harmonisation 
of legislation and practices, a European police force with investigative and 
operational powers and a comprehensive and functioning criminal justice system, 
working in parallel to national systems. Such objectives have never sustained 
consensus amongst the MS and as such EU instruments have been rarely used in an 
operational manner.   
In seeking to retain the initiative, the Commission has moved from a regulatory 
framework to one based on removing the legitimacy of MS to control the information 
and therefore frame the policy debate in their own terms.  This now appears the route 
that the Commission as well as the independent European agencies will be taking in 
the near future.  Europeanization and the domestic impact of the EU in the field of 
drugs should not be assessed on MS participation in joint operations, in legal 
harmonisation efforts nor in other forms of practical cooperation.  EU instruments in 
these areas have proven themselves weak and non-binding and a great deal of 
variation persists throughout the EU.  Domestic change can be seen in the 
importance national institutions place in information, how this is produced, 
disseminated and used in policy (and political) goals.   
The next section of this paper will demonstrate how, through this period, the UK‟s 
policy preferences have placed drug information and intelligence at the forefront of 
its supply reduction policy and in doing so have incorporated European norms into 
its domestic institutions.  
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5 – UK Drug Policy and the introduction of New Policing Paradigms 
 
The UK is faced with three significant challenges in combating international drug 
trafficking, (1) it is one of the largest consumers of drugs in Europe, providing a 
large market place for those who wish to import drugs; (2) it is a major transport and 
trade hub with strong links to producer and transit countries, providing criminals 
with the means and opportunity to import drugs, however; (3) historically the UK 
public has been unsupportive of deeper integration with the EU, and support from the 
public and politicians for moving operation control of law enforcement to Europol 
has been particularly weak.  The focus of UK drug policy has consistently been to 
balance these forces, on the one hand to reduce international organised crime and its 
impact on the UK, an activity that inevitably entails the close cooperation of British 
law enforcement officers with international agencies, whilst, on the other hand, 
maintaining national control over law enforcement operations and the sovereignty of 
British territory and officers. 
 
The following chapter will show how, within the framework of the EU, the UK has 
attempted to face the challenge of drug importation and cross-border crime whilst 
retaining national control over law enforcement, firstly by remaining outside the 
institutional framework of Schengen, and other formal joint operational frameworks, 
whilst simultaneously encouraging international cooperation through the sharing of 
information and the collaboration of law enforcement officers, then secondly by 
associating its own policy of „Intelligence Led Policing‟ with an EU preference for 
„evidence-based‟ policy making.  This first strategy represents a rejection of 
European norms and a more one sided „uploading‟ of national preference whereas the 
latter strategy demonstrates a more balanced approach whereby national preferences 
are moved upward to accommodate and complement existing EU paradigms. 
 
The popular perception of the UK, both internally and externally, has been as a 
„reluctant partner‟ in EU affairs.  This has largely been due to the stance taken by 
successive British governments, both Conservative and Labour, that has publicly set 
the UK apart from deeper EU integration whilst political elites have privately 
acknowledged the importance of European partners and transnational policy 
networks.  This is exemplified by the various opt-outs (and opt-ins) that UK 
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governments have succeeded in obtaining in different policy areas, including the 
Schengen accords, Economic and Monetary Union and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and Police and Judicial Cooperation.  These actions, it is argued, have led to a 
„two-speed Europe‟, whereby MS are allowed to pick and choose their level of 
integration dependant on national preferences, so called 'free-riding', nonetheless, in 
doing so they lose influence in the policy making process as such actions are 
perceived badly by other partners.  This viewpoint has recently been challenged in a 
number of papers which show that, in the case of JHA (Adler-Nissen, 2009) and the 
Euro (Naurin & Lindhal, 2010), rather than suffering from a loss of influence due to 
its position on the periphery, the UK has maintained an influence in these areas either 
through actively promoting its own policy preferences as a source of „best practice‟ 
or by its mere presence and in the relevant committees and networks.  This chapter 
will add to this work, arguing that not only did the UK help keep Europol from 
developing into an operational transnational police force but that the UK's model of 
Intelligence-led policing became the principle paradigm for the functioning of the 
European Police Office.  Further to this, the creation of the UK's Serious Organised 
Crime Agency (SOCA) has demonstrated a further shift whereby the UK‟s drug 
policy in supply reduction has moved further towards the European goal of „evidence 
based‟ policy making. 
 
5.1 - pre-1992: Origins of UK policy - bringing intelligence to the fore  
 
Before 1995 there was no single UK policy document that outlined national strategy 
and aims in the fight against drugs.  Despite this, the issue was high on the political 
agenda, particularly in response to the Schengen Accord and the creation of the 
Single European Market, the predicted effects of which it was feared would have a 
dramatic result on the supply of drugs entering the UK.  In 1989 the House of 
Commons Home Affairs Committee produced a report on Drug Trafficking and 
Related Serious Crime (Home Affairs Committee, 1989).  In the drafting of this 
report the cross-party committee interviewed and accepted evidence from a wide 
range of policy makers and policy practitioners, including a Home Office Minister, 
Law Enforcement officers and the head of the UK Drugs Intelligence Unit.  The 
conclusions of the Committee were that there existed six essential requirements for 
countering the current and projected threat from drug trafficking: 
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i) No legalization of drugs which are illegal at present; 
ii) Active involvement in international efforts against drug misuse; 
iii) New and reinforced legislation to trace, seize and confiscate the assets of drug 
traffickers; 
iv) Greater co-ordination and integration of the drug law enforcement effort; 
v) An effective intelligence system to support law enforcement; 
vi) A coherent and balanced strategy for tackling drug misuse. 
(Home Affairs Committee, 1989; p.xli) 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, at the time of this report, EU activity in the 
drugs field was largely limited to a number of informal expert and practitioner 
groups, such as the PG and TREVI, set up to increase the level of communication 
and cooperation amongst national law enforcement agencies and which acted as a 
forum for high level law enforcement officers to compare best practice, rather than to 
collaborate in any operational sense. The UK was particularly concerned by the 
possible threats to its security that open internal borders in Europe posed, and was an 
active supporter and participant in these groups, although the UK‟s involvement went 
well beyond this informal setting.  UK law enforcement agencies were amongst the 
first in Europe to systematically post agents, Drug Liaison Officers (DLO), in drug 
producer and transit countries including, importantly, other European countries 
(Spain and the Netherlands being the first).  DLOs were seen by law enforcement 
agencies as vital tools in reducing drug supply.  In his evidence to the House of 
Commons Home Affairs Committee, for their 1989 report on drug trafficking, Barry 
Price, the National Drugs Coordinator, described the importance of the role of DLOs 
as follows: “…I am saying categorically that [DLOs] are of immense value and that 
we must find ways of increasing their presence, particularly throughout Europe” 
(Home Affairs Committee, 1989; 133).   
 
This support was corroborated by the Home Office Minister, Douglas Hogg MP, in 
his own evidence to the committee.  The Minister also elaborated on the 
Conservative government‟s plans to increase the practice, raising the number of 
DLOs by five in the following year (Home Affairs Committee, 1989; 151).  The 
Minister's evidence provides an insight into how the government of the time viewed 
not only the UK's 'style' of policing but the view that this style should be 
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implemented throughout Europe to help combat drug trafficking, and that failure to 
do so was having serious consequences for police cooperation in Europe.  The UK, at 
this time, was champion of a more formal and structured level of police cooperation 
– the European Drugs Intelligence Unit – which would be based on its own drugs 
Intelligence Model, the Minister admitted, “this is an area where [the UK] are very 
much in the lead.  Until other countries have intelligence units which are comparable 
in terms of functioning, it would be difficult to establish a European [police force]...” 
(ibid).   
 
The main characteristics of the UK approach to policing at this time included: 
i. The emphasis on intelligence as a tool of pro-active policing; 
ii. The identification of stakeholders (providers and receivers) of intelligence; 
iii. The centralisation of intelligence gathering and dissemination; 
This approach was an early development in the move towards 'Intelligence-led 
Policing'.  The results, nevertheless, were disappointing in terms of the reaction of 
other European partners, who the UK government felt weren‟t moving with the same 
sense of urgency in these matters. 
 
One particular criticism was that in Europe, as in the UK, much of the domestic 
investigations and operations against drug trafficking were collaborations between 
different national agencies, typically police and customs.  The culture in many 
European countries was one of mistrust and competition between agencies, rather 
than cooperation and resource sharing.  This led to intelligence being hoarded within 
single agencies instead of being disseminated between them.  The UK‟s solution to 
this was to set up a single national unit, the National Drugs Intelligence Unit, for the 
collection and dissemination of intelligence, which would also be the contact point 
for national agencies to feed into a European intelligence system.  This single 
national reporting unit was advocated as the model of choice for other European 
countries who would ultimately report to a single European unit, the European Drugs 
Intelligence Unit, however, the UK delegation was disappointed with the speed and 
effectiveness with which this was implemented in Europe and complained of 
lingering mistrust that hindered national and international operational information 
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exchange. 
 
One of the advantages envisaged for the UK's advocacy for the increased sharing of 
information and intelligence in international police matters was that, paradoxically, 
this would give UK agencies a greater degree of independence in operational matters 
and enable the UK to keep a higher level of sovereignty over matters such as border 
controls.  Many of the issues that faced continental European police forces, for 
example the issue of the continuation of cross border operations and „hot chases‟ that 
were of great concern to France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, were either 
not geographically relevant or were not politically possible, given the UK's situation 
with such a high degree of public euroscepticism. 
 
Police cooperation in Europe was the subject of a report by the same select 
committee in the following year.  It was argued that, due to both the large increase in 
visits to the UK from Europe and the impending legislative changes in 1992, a report 
on the current state of police cooperation between the UK and European states was 
prescient.  This report again emphasised the risks that were believed to result from 
the free movement of persons within the Community, as well as the added 
importance of increased police cooperation in order to combat these risks, and 
affirms the general political view in the UK that a restrictive approach, through the 
maintenance of border checks, was not incompatible with greater European 
integration, “it would be absurd if we were to throw away the natural advantage we 
have as an island.” (David Waddington MP, Home Secretary, quoted in Home Affairs 
Committee, 1990: p.xi).   
 
The UK‟s decision to maintain opt-outs of the 1985 Schengen agreement, whilst at 
the same time forging ahead with deeper integration in the Single Market, had 
profound implications on the future of British border policing, particularly in the area 
of drug trafficking.  It was argued at the time of the Schengen negotiations, and 
indeed often since then, that the UK‟s position as an island has led to the 
development of a strong border control system that is incompatible with European 
norms that have tended to focus on weaker border checks and strong internal checks, 
through mechanisms such as ID cards (Belchak, 1994: p94; House of Lords as 
quoted in Weiner, 1999).  As Weiner (1999: p447) demonstrates though, such 
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arguments are not backed by empirical evidence which suggests that, „Britain‟s 
position is not so typical in its reliance on border controls, that is not a typical 
British tradition only‟ (ibid). Weiner argues that Britain‟s opt-outs result, not solely 
from Eurosceptic discourse, but from the clash between entrenched domestic norms 
(regarding citizenship and sovereignty) with emerging supranational norms 
(European integration as a „good thing‟ and output-orientated policy legitimacy).  
The collision of these forces has led to the increased social acceptability of flexible 
integration, a break from the hard regulation that facilitated the market creating and 
economic era of integration. 
 
Mentioned only briefly by Weiner is the dual nature of the Schengen agreement - on 
the one hand, border controls were to be softened, but to compensate for the possible 
security implications of this a new system of intelligence gathering, the Schengen 
Information System (SIS), would be created to help effectively police the area.  The 
sharing of information and intelligence between European law enforcement officers 
was seen by the UK not just as the lesser of two evils but in line with the policy 
preferences and dominant police thinking of the times.  With regards to the first 
action, British border controls remained in place, albeit with cursory passport checks 
for EU citizens, whilst involvement in the second action, the information exchange 
and policing cooperation, gathered pace and formed along with the idea of a 
European Drugs Intelligence Unit.  This view of the political establishment and law 
enforcement personnel, was expressed succinctly by the Home Affairs Committee: 
The work undertaken by the Schengen partners…does not have any 
direct bearing on policing in the United Kingdom.  However, we shall 
be interested in the various EC fora to find out more about the 
arrangements envisaged in Schengen, such as the proposed information 
system. 
(Home Affairs Committee, 1990; 10) 
In effect much of the policy of this period can be summed up by this dualistic 
approach: on the one hand rejecting the formalised and institutional instruments such 
as Schengen which, it was argued, would damage British interests, and on the other 
hand, to actively engage and promote British best practice, in particular the informal 
groups and forums attended by leading law enforcement officers and also the British 
system of intelligence gathering and overseas liaison officers.  It was recognised by 
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both political and police actor coalitions that action at the European level was 
inevitable, given the changes that were occurring in Europe regarding the Single 
Market and the opening of borders, these actors were active in the PG, TREVI and 
CELAD.   
 
At this stage, the norms and institutions of the EU in the field of drug policy were not 
compatible with the policy preferences of the UK, however, the UK took a 
constructive approach and engaged with European partners in areas where they felt 
their interests lay, namely the exchange of information and intelligence.  
Europeanization processes were in their very early stages and this resistance from the 
UK and other MS is evidence of national preferences and norms being consolidated 
at the European level.  Attempts at institutionalisation, in the form of Europol was 
not complete at this time because its aims and function were still contested, but the 
consensus for European action existed and MS, with the UK in the forefront, were 
driving closer cooperation.  Here though, the nature of this cooperation was still 
undecided. 
 
5.2 - 1992-2000: The First UK Policies  
 
The limits and nature of cooperation in the field of illicit drugs, in the period around 
the implementation of the TEU, were explained by the Home Secretary, Kenneth 
Clark, in his evidence to the Home Affairs Committee, in 1993, who, at this time, 
was examining the changes that would be introduced after the treaty came into force,  
“...we are not contemplating other police forces being able to have, say, powers of a 
constable here...We cooperate with other police forces but that means they come here 
and work through the British Police.” (Home Affairs Committee, 1993: p21).  Rather 
than allowing a supranational police force to develop from Europol, with police 
powers across the EU, the British policy was to promote and encourage Europol as 
an important intelligence gathering organization.  There was, nonetheless, still a great 
deal of political and public mistrust of Europol and it was argued that Europol may 
suffer from a degree of 'organizational slip', where the original aims and powers of 
the organization are expanded upon.  The Home Secretary sought to calm such fears 
to the Committee and to outline the situation around the negotiating table: “The 
British are not in favour of [a European Police Force] and...the clear majority of 
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Member-states were against that and there are quite enough Member-states where 
Governments and public opinion would be vehemently opposed to any such idea of a 
multinational police force...it is not remotely what we are talking about and recent 
discussions on Europol...have been solely on the area of intelligence gathering.” 
(ibid: p23).   
 
Despite the fears to the contrary the British government were committed to a policy 
which avoided direct operational cooperation and which veered away from the 
harmonisation of national laws to favour a deeper commitment to the sharing of 
intelligence.  The British were not alone in this thinking and a number of other MS 
also resisted the idea of foreign police in their territory.  The UK was still committed 
to the idea, in principle, of increased European cooperation but only in terms of 
intelligence.  Looking back at the terms of the Europol convention (see previous 
chapter), and the remit given to the police office, it is apparent that these preferences 
were fundamental in the creation of an organization that was limited to an 
intelligence role.  Although these preferences were not solely of the UK, it is 
important to note that their preferences were amongst those that won through. 
 
Prime Minister John Major continued this approach of active engagement and policy 
promotion at the Corfu European Council, in 1994, in which he advocated a stronger 
commitment to Europol from Member-states and stressed the importance of the 
organization in the fight against international drug smuggling (Council of the 
European Union, 1994).  This action was, however, typical of the Conservative 
approach to European at this time, an approach which Brown Pappamikail (1998) 
characterises as being like 'Jekyll & Hyde'.  On the one hand they admitted in private 
and to European partners that one of the most effective ways to achieve UK policy 
goals was through greater European integration and by giving greater power to the 
European Commission, but this was never argued forcefully in public, and instead 
compromise was always sought that kept EU policies in line with UK preferences 
and maintained the primacy of decision-making with the UK government. 
 
The commitment to international cooperation in illicit drug control continued to be a 
priority of UK government policy through the period of the first UK drugs policies 
(1995-2000).  In 1992 the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) was created 
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as a horizontal service to collect and disseminate intelligence between the largely 
independent British police force.    Regional police forces would feed the NCIS with 
intelligence which could then be analysed at the national level.  This intelligence was 
then fed back to regional police forces and the National Crime Squad (NCS).  Its 
relationship with the UK various police forces is made clear in the 1995 UK Drug 
Strategy, 
NCIS does not conduct its own drugs operations.  Individual police 
services, regional crime squads and Customs carry out the operational 
role in detection and prevention.  The objective of NCIS is to assist police 
and Customs by providing them with intelligence to help them target 
major criminals. 
(UK Government, 1995: p8) 
Such a system operated on the principle of „economies of scale‟ that informed much 
of the thinking in law enforcement at the time, both within the UK and in Europe as a 
whole, whereby scarce resources, such as intelligence, could be more effectively 
managed centrally rather than being dispersed at the local level.  This system offered 
a much more strategic approach to policing as well as circumventing regional and 
inter-agency competition.  It was this model that was suggested for Europol, with its 
role being designated as a fixed central point to receive intelligence, staffed by 
seconded national experts, who would then report, through the national focal points, 
to operational units within the country. 
 
The UK‟s first comprehensive drug strategy, Tackling Drugs Together – UK Drug 
Strategy 1995-1998 (UK Government, 1994), is striking because of its modern focus 
on creating a horizontal and comprehensive strategy, both on a geographical level, 
establishing the clear links between local level crime and transnational organised 
crime, as well as affirming the links between the various policy fields including 
health, education and policing.   It is very much a „multi-level‟ approach whereby 
regional operational units are guided by various supporting networks on the national 
and international level.  Whilst the document does not contain specific targets or 
actions, maintaining a vague language throughout, it is an attempt to create a 
coordinated response to the drug issue. European cooperation initiatives, and both 
formal and informal networks, are completely absent from the document and whilst 
the document does acknowledge the importance of the international sources of drugs 
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entering the UK and in the importance of cooperation in fighting this, the strategy 
develops community based responses to these problems. 
 
The other striking feature of the policy is the central role that coordination and 
information play in this.  At this time, the number of government departments 
directly involved in the drugs policy stood at 14 and, in order to better coordinate 
action, a sub-committee was created which was to be attended at the Ministerial or 
Parliamentary Under-secretary level (UK Government, 1994, 12).  The UK already 
had a scientific advisory committee, the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs, 
established under the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act, and these would present the 
coordination committee with the relevant scientific data and reports as required.  At 
this time the EU was already beginning to move in the direction of comprehensive 
and horizontal coordination and advocating that MS increase the scientific research 
in policy making in the field of drugs.  The UK was already an active participant in 
the EMCDDA, its NFP had been providing data since the creation of the agency, and 
the UK was praised for its significant body of research at this point (EMCDDA, 
1997: p66).  UK policy making relied heavily on information and evidence to 
provide legitimacy in the creation of policies.  The generation of information was 
also fundamental to the assessment of policies instituted by the New Public 
Management style of public administration that dominated UK public services in the 
mid-1990s (Butterfield, Edwards and Woodall, 2005).  These policy norms, 
therefore, already existed in the UK before their incorporation in the make-up of the 
EU.  The UK advocated heavily for this approach because it matched well their own 
institutional logic and adaptation would be minimal. 
 
The publication of the second UK drug strategy, 1998‟s „Tackling Drugs to Build a 
Better Britain‟ coincided with the UK‟s presidency of the European Union and was 
again an opportunity for the UK to lead the debate in the field of drug policy.  One of 
the primary focuses of the UK‟s presidency was the fight against organised crime and 
the UK government was particularly active in promoting continued international 
cooperation to fight drug trafficking.  The achievements of the presidency seem 
modest but two of the most important, in terms of the future of European drug policy, 
were the agreement and ratification of the Europol budget and the planning work 
towards the next EU Drug Strategy and Action Plans (2000-2005) which included a 
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report on EU activity in the drug field (Home Office, 1998). 
 
Financial control and administrative control over Europol was essential to British 
interests at this time because through the distribution of resources and MS presence 
on the Management Board the power to set the work agenda lay with domestic policy 
makers.  This avoided any spillover into activities that encroached on MS 
competence.  This emphasis on institutional resourcing was also seen in the UK's 
1998 Drug Strategy which continued a NPM agenda of linking policy outcomes with 
resources and expanding the number of stakeholders in any policy field to provide a 
wider strategic view (UK Government, 1998). 
 
The UK's commitment to international cooperation through this period was as strong 
as in previous years, but the emphasis remained on the sharing of intelligence rather 
than being tied to operational roles.  In addition to traditional political reserve and the 
desire to maintain national sovereignty the popular New Policy Management agenda 
put a greater demand on public institutions to provide information and data in order 
to evaluate their performance and justify their resources.  It was still felt that joint 
operations in the EU offered bad value for money when compared to intelligence 
gathering.  The UK envisaged a European system similar to their own, with a central 
body to collect intelligence from local agencies, making the best use of a limited 
resource.  The vast amount of national data collected by the UK in this period also 
meant that the UK was one of the most prolific contributors to the EMCDDA.  This 
had the double effect of making the UK appear 'a good partner', by fulfilling its 
obligations so completely, as well as putting itself in a prime position as a leader in 
the research field and therefore able to frame the debate in its own terms. 
 
5.3 - 2000-2008: SOCA and the institutionalisation of information 
 
The information annually collected and sent to the EMCDDA by the UK NFP was 
produced according to a format and standards agreed upon by the MS.  This system 
represents a period of consultation and consensus on what is useful, comparable and 
reliable in terms of drug data.  The drug indicators were discussed regularly at expert 
group meetings, with representatives of all MS, and changes and adaptations made 
when needed but, in general, the system of data gathering was institutionalised at the 
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domestic level, at least in terms of health and social data.  In these consultations and 
debates the UK are at a significant advantage due to their strong reputation in the 
field of drug research.  In terms of supply reduction data, the systems for producing 
and collecting data existed outside of the EMCDDA‟s institutional format.  Data on 
drug offences, arrests, seizures and purity were collected regularly, but the 
procedures for their collection were the product of law enforcement needs rather than 
Europeanised mechanisms and were not designed to be either directly comparable 
with other European countries or reliable in the scientific sense of the word. 
 
Intelligence-led policing had been the approach of UK law enforcement since the 
mid-1990s and it is a system which places information and intelligence at the 
forefront of a proactive policing agenda.  The information that such a system 
generates is extremely useful for law enforcement agents, for example indicating the 
location of national and international criminal networks or spotting trends in drug 
trafficking routes or techniques.  This data is produced as an operational source, 
designed to be used in on-going operations and is, therefore, not suitable for either 
academic research or, in many cases, even for policy making.  One of the problems 
that the UK faced at the turn of the century was that if the government's approach to 
public administration dictated that information and data was needed to justify the 
allocation of resources then the information produced on law enforcement responses, 
and in this case drug trafficking and supply reduction, needed to be reliable and 'fit 
for public consumption.' 
 
In 2002, despite being only four years into the ten year drug strategy, the Labour 
government issued an updated drug strategy.  This new strategy provided the UK 
government with an opportunity to promote the progress made in achieving the goals 
of the previous strategy.  One of the most noticeable aspects of this policy is its 
greater reliance on research and statistics used to illustrate the size of the drug 
problem and previous policy successes (and failures). The drug situation in the UK is 
mapped in detail (UK Government, 2002: p15) with survey results for prevalence 
and frequency of drug use as well as other drug indicators.  This reliance on research 
and data is further emphasised by Annex 2 which is an overview of the 
improvements to the evidence base between the years 1998-2002.  This section is 
comprehensive in its coverage of data sources and, whilst sections on health, social 
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reintegration and youth substance abuse are relatively large, the section on supply 
reduction data indicates a big increase in knowledge since 1998.  The wide variety of 
cited sources also demonstrates the government‟s willingness to include academic 
research and data in supply reduction analysis whereas traditionally this had been the 
preserve of law enforcement (ibid: p76).    
 
In addition to restating the general UK policy goals, this strategy also reemphasises 
the actions in international cooperation and the UK‟s engagement with EU policies.  
The strategy promotes both the bilateral and EU instituted cooperation focusing on 
supply routes from the Caribbean and Afghanistan and also details the work the UK 
does with EU candidate and third countries in the field of capacity building (ibid: 
pp29-30).  This policy is a continuation of previous UK governments who sought to 
present UK cooperation as integral, but separate, to EU action and is in keeping with 
the general EU norms of the period.  EU action was seen to compliment national and 
bilateral action and the UK remained a pace-setter in the extent of its involvement 
abroad, albeit outside of EU frameworks, and by 2002 had a network of 60 DLO 
across the globe. 
 
After coming into being in 1998, the National Crime Squad and NCIS were 
important in this period in coordinating intelligence work across the UK, between the 
different regional police forces.  This model proved so successful that the policy 
approach was formally adopted into the EU framework in 2004.  The Hague 
European Council formally institutionalised the concept of Intelligence-led Policing 
as the model for policing in Europe (House of Lords, 2008: p105).  From this point 
onwards information and intelligence would be a fundamental part of policing across 
the EU as well as within Europol and the UK would use their presidency of the EU, 
in 2005, to further reinforce this shift.  In the UK, Intelligence-led policing had been 
formalised through the National Intelligence Model (NIM) which set out the 
principles of the approach.  The primary goal was to create a police force that 
proactively generated, analysed and shared intelligence to better fight crime (John 
and Maguire, 2004).  The UK presidency of the EU introduced a similar plan to be 
used Europe-wide.  The European Criminal Intelligence Model (ECIM) was an 
attempt by the UK government, with support of the rest of the Council, to change the 
way law enforcement agencies worked and how they processed and dealt with 
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intelligence. 
 
A fundamental part of the UK‟s formalisation of the NIM was a new agency which 
was to take the place of the NCIS.  The Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) 
was designed as a new concept in British policing, as a proactive intelligence 
gathering agency.  It fulfilled many of the old functions of NCIS, acting as a focal 
point and liaison for regional forces, and it was also the designated UK contact point 
with Europol and Interpol.  However, it recruited its personnel not only from officers 
in the field of intelligence but also from active operational police and customs 
officers.  The legal situation was complex but SOCA officers could be designated as 
constables under British law and some had the power of arrest.  SOCA‟s original 
functions, as outlined in the Act creating it, were: 
 preventing and detecting serious organized crime; 
 contributing to the reduction of serious organized crime in other ways and to the 
mitigation of its consequences; (SOCAP Act 2005, s. 2(1)); and 
 (in relation to all crime, not just serious organized crime) gathering, storing, 
analyzing and disseminating information relevant to the prevention, detection, 
investigation or prosecution of offences or the reduction of crime in other ways 
or the mitigation of its consequences (SOCAP Act 2005, s. 3(1)). 
(Harfield, 2006: p748) 
This meant that SOCA‟s main functions were largely intelligence based and seen as 
part of a larger strategy to concentrate on disrupting middle and high level drug 
markets (UK Government, 2002). 
 
SOCA was promoted, in its inception, as an innovation in British policing, a 
movement towards a more modern approach to law enforcement, „SOCA will work in 
a fundamentally different way to its predecessors ... SOCA will be a genuinely 
intelligence-led organization. Real knowledge and understanding of the problems 
must be its first responsibility. That in turn will drive decisions about which activities 
to target and the best means of attacking them‟ (Caroline Flint MP, quoted in 
Harfield, 2006).   Some scholars have argued this move towards proactive 
intelligence gathering was a way to further a government agenda that seeks to 
increase resources for law enforcement by increasing public fear of organised crime 
(see Ashworth 2002: pp96–108).  Whilst there may be some evidence for this, these 
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moves towards an intelligence and information led policing agenda have a long 
history and represent a consistent approach and policy preference in the UK. 
 
Whether or not the creation of SOCA was a pivotal innovation in UK law 
enforcement, or the continuation of a long established policy approach, it represented 
to the UK‟s European partners further progress in the field and, as such, had an 
important role in EU drug policy.  The EU was committed to making progress in 
drug policy and encouraged innovation from its MS.  It was beneficial for the UK 
government to advocate its own „innovations‟ at the EU level, as this reduced 
adaptational costs and there is evidence that it was successful in doing just this.  The 
benefits of the adoption of the ECIM were described as thus: 
 Improving common knowledge of serious and organised crime through more 
effective collection, exchange, and analysis, of information; 
 Increasing the effectiveness of Europol and other EU bodies; 
 Achieving better operational results in the highest priority areas; 
 Achieving greater accountability to Ministers in delivering action against 
Council priorities; 
 Allowing all Member States and relevant EU institutions to observe a common 
methodology for tackling serious and organised crime in the EU. 
(UK Government, 2005) 
 
The first and last points are the most important in relation to the Europeanization 
processes previously discussed.  The ECIM makes the generation of information, 
knowledge and intelligence the focus of European policing.  The UK government 
envisaged that their policy approach could help create common methodology in 
tackling organised crime.  The ECIM would, therefore, be evidence of common 
norms and „ways of doing things‟ being consolidated and institutionalised at the 
European level, whilst maintaining flexibility of national action and for MS to adapt 
the approach to their own domestic context. 
 
A move to a more proactive generation of knowledge was also the fate of Europol.  
In 2006 the principle public output of Europol, the presentation of its work for public 
consumption, changed.  Its signature product went from being a retrospective annual 
report of the work done in the previous year to the Organised Crime Threat 
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Assessment (OCTA) (Harfield, 2006).  What OCTA does is to outline the coming 
threats and trends in organised crime, as well as detailing control strategies for 
Europol and MS as recommendations.  This proactive approach is much more in line 
with the UK's modernist, Intelligence-led approach to policing and the UK's own 
Threat Assessment Reports were highly influential in the creation of Europol's own 
OCTA.  The Director of Europol, Max-Peter Ratzel, praises the UK‟s contribution to 
the development of the first OCTA, “…the Council took a decision at the Hague 
Council in November 2004 to introduce intelligence-led law enforcement as a 
concept in Europe and at the same time they asked Europol to draft the first 
Organised Crime Threat Assessment…we were very much supported by the British 
Presidency.” (House of Lords, 2008: p105).  The importance of the OCTA was that 
not only did it legitimise a British policy approach, that had been institutionalised in 
the creation of SOCA, but, as reported later by Mr Ratzel, it encouraged other MS to 
follow suit.  By 2008 around half the MS had an intelligence-led control strategy for 
combatting organised crime and drug trafficking, as advocated by Europol (ibid: 
p110). 
 
5.4 - 2008-present: Law enforcement and harm reduction  
 
The period up to 2008 was marked by EU policing policies moving closer towards 
the UK model, and the UK policy preferences in drug supply reduction policy 
becoming prominent.  In the last few years, however, this relationship has altered 
slightly, the EU has regained some initiative, and, much as it did in the early period 
of EU drug policy, is seeking to frame the policy debate in its own terms. 
 
As the previous section demonstrated, law enforcement agencies had evolved from 
being responsive actors to being proactive, both in their control activities and also in 
their generation of information and knowledge.  This period also saw increased 
interaction between law enforcement actors and researchers and academics from 
other fields which helped facilitate a transfer of techniques and approaches.  There 
remained, nevertheless, issues in the data collection for agencies like the EMCDDA 
who still found law enforcement and criminal justice data difficult to compare and 
unreliable (EMCDDA, 2009b).  Despite the increase in volume, much of the 
domestic data was still being produced according to a law enforcement agenda, i.e. to 
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support national law enforcement responses, or else the data was subject to large 
discrepancies due to changes in operational priorities.  In this instance the EU again 
attempted to gain some oversight over the data and information being produced.  As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the EU Action Plan talks about the development 
of shared indicators on supply reduction issues which would constrain the data 
production of national law enforcement data and keep them in line with agreed 
standards.  Just as Europol incorporated EU policy into domestic logic, in terms of 
policing methods, the EMCDDA would have a role in doing the same for law 
enforcement data. 
 
In the UK, SOCA was also being criticised at this time for not producing tangible 
results that justified the high level of resources being spent on it.  One argument was 
that public and political dissatisfaction was due to much of SOCA‟s work being in 
partnership with other national and international agencies and therefore it was 
difficult to demonstrate the distinct value of its contributions (Mackenzie and 
Hamilton-Smith, 2011: 22).  Another argument is that as an organization whose main 
currency was intelligence and information it is difficult to quantify these for any 
assessment exercise.  Mackenzie and Hamilton-Smith also argue that there was a 
fundamental flaw in the brief that SOCA was given by the UK government to reduce 
the harm caused by organised crime, because such a role is both unquantifiable and 
contested by other social institutions (ibid: p24). 
 
SOCA‟s role as an agency of harm reduction is a particularly controversial one 
because traditionally harm reduction has been conceptualised as a public health 
issue, and specifically one which minimises harms caused by law enforcement 
control and suppression (Elvins, 2008).  In a controversial move, UK law 
enforcement activities became increasingly described in terms of the harms they 
prevented, the community and to society in general.  Around the time of SOCA‟s 
creation, Home Office Minister Baroness Scotland, described the agency as, “a step 
change away from a classic investigation organization of investigation and 
prosecution toward employing the most effective and proportionate means dedicated 
to reducing the harm done by organised crime.” (Hansard (Lords), 5 April 2005).  
SOCA‟s own conceptualisation of harms is particularly interesting as it approaches 
the issue in a comprehensive manner, both in geographical terms, from the local to 
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the international level, and in terms of the type of harms (SOCA, 2009: Appendix I). 
Harm reduction is an essential part of the European approach to drugs and had been 
an important part of the public health component of drug policies since the arrival of 
drugs on the EU‟s agenda (European Commission, 2005, EMCDDA, 2010a).  Its 
movement into the logic of domestic institutions, even in a case quite out of its usual 
context, would suggest that Europeanization processes have been at least partially 
successful in the case of the UK.  The UK has witnessed the success of the EU‟s 
approach and the legitimacy that it now maintains in the field of drugs.  It is 
beneficial to the UK‟s own policy aims to share this legitimacy, especially in the field 
of supply reduction where the data produced is not as trusted as in other policy areas.  
It is difficult to know what the future holds for UK drug policy, especially in the 
current climate of increasing economic crisis and growing mistrust in the EU and its 
mechanisms.  The public appetite for deeper EU involvement has never been 
particularly high and has reduced significantly since the start of the global downturn.  
EU mechanisms in other policy areas have shown themselves to be weaker than 
previously thought and there are many drug policy analysts who predict that hard 
economic times could see dramatic increases in drug problems.   
 
Since the Coalition government came to power drugs have been a relatively low 
policy priority.  A new drug strategy has been published (UK Government, 2010) 
which emphasises the UK‟s commitment to working with international partners to 
fight drugs at all levels of the market, however this is the first drug strategy to be 
produced since 1998 without an associated action plan and concrete tasks.  Although 
not mentioned in the strategy, the UK law enforcement establishment has also been 
shaken up and SOCA is to be replaced by the National Crime Agency.  These reforms 
have yet to take shape and so it is difficult to predict what effect they will have on 
UK supply reduction policy or the relationship between the UK and the EU in this 
area, but, as the preceding section has demonstrated, the UK has maintained a 
consistent policy of engagement at a distance and it is likely this will persist.  
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6. Conclusions 
UN conventions provide a basic framework of prohibition for the international 
control of illicit drugs, but despite this equal legislative base, drug policies 
throughout the EU vary, and will continue to vary due to a variety of domestic 
conditions and contexts.  These range from different levels of drug use and 
preferences, for different drug types, to variations in legal tradition and practice.  
Despite this, the EU has been directly involved in the policy area for almost 20 years 
and in that time has developed a distinct approach to drug policy.  Given these 
conditions, this paper sought to better understand the significance of European 
integration in drug policy, and to see the impact of EU policies at the domestic level.   
The UK is an excellent case through which to better understand the mechanisms of 
Europeanization in drug policy. In the period since the entry of drug policy in to the 
EU arena, the UK has been actively involved in promoting its own policy 
preferences and also in absorbing EU norms into its domestic institutions.  There is a 
wealth of textual evidence to demonstrate that, despite public resistance to European 
integration.  Political elites and law enforcement actors have both resorted to EU 
institutions to better achieve their own policy goals. 
National cooperation in drugs at the European level has existed long before formal 
EU competence in the area.  Intergovernmental groups such as the PG, TREVI and 
CELAD brought together policy actors at the political, administrative and technical 
level and provided a forum for socialisation and policy learning.  These informal 
groups paved the way for later, more formal, EU led policy networks but their 
presence at such an early stage in the policy lifespan demonstrates a strong MS 
desire to engage at the European level. 
The first hypothesis of this paper was that MS arrived at a consensus that the threat 
of international drug trafficking meant that EU level solutions provided „added 
value‟.  This seems to be supported by the evidence presented.  The defining moment 
in this policy area was the period between the Schengen Accord and the TEU, when 
open borders and the free movement of people and goods raised the threat of an 
increase in organised crime and drug trafficking.  Many countries had already 
undertaken bilateral action and the UK‟s decision to post DLOs in transit and 
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producer countries, well before these changes took place, demonstrates MS were 
looking beyond domestic solutions to these policy problems. 
The initial consensus amongst MS was that the best way to compliment domestic 
actions would be through the facilitated exchange of information and intelligence.  
The previous experience of policy actors, at all levels, in the informal 
intergovernmental groups had prepared them for greater engagement with European 
partners.  There were limits to the nature of the cooperation.  In the case of the UK 
this manifested itself in the promotion of a formalised European agency for the 
exchange of intelligence, what would become Europol, yet it remained outside of the 
formal provisions of the Schengen Accord and maintained its border checks. 
Despite decision-making in the drug policy area remaining intergovernmental in 
nature, this period saw the concept of information and intelligence gather, at the 
European level, became institutionalised norms.  The EMCDDA helped to create a 
series of drug indicators by which the drug situation in Europe could be better 
understood.  This development was beneficial for the UK because it was a close fit to 
its existing domestic institutional norms, which provides ideal conditions for the 
transfer of policy (Börzel &  Risse, 2000).  The UK was a world leader in drug 
research, at this time, and this allowed its influence in the area of information 
gathering to grow.   
These existing domestic institutional norms played an important role in the 
development of Europol.  Political will to create an operational European police 
force was weak across the MS and there was also resistance from law enforcement 
actors.  The solution to this was the emphasis on Europol as a central body for the 
collection and dissemination of intelligence and data.  Once again, this policy 
development was a good fit to existing conditions in the UK, whose own system of 
law enforcement intelligence gathering was in the process of being centralised.  Both 
the European and the UK models operated on the same principle of „economies of 
scale‟, whereby greater strategic value could be gained from a scarce resource, in this 
case intelligence, if it was disseminated through a central body.   
As stated at the beginning of this paper, the creation of the EMCDDA and Europol as 
information gathering agencies helped to shape EU policies in the area of supply 
reduction.  Both agencies have developed, to different degrees, as legitimate sources 
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of information on supply reduction.  This legitimacy has empowered the EU to frame 
both policy problems and policy responses with their own evidence.  Although MS 
are ultimately responsible for providing both agencies with data, the systems and 
shared standards are the result of community agreement which discourages MS from 
deviant behaviour and encourages compliance.  
In addition to the agencies it has helped create, the largest impact of the EU has been 
through its Drug strategies and action plans.  These documents set out the goals of 
drug policies in the EU.  Over time these goals, in the sphere of supply reduction, 
have become more specific yet more modest in reach.  Initial attempts at legal 
harmonisation were met with resistance from the MS and tools for greater 
cooperation in law enforcement, through Europol, and criminal justice, through 
Eurojust, were underutilised.   The policy intentions, in these cases, were far 
removed from the policy outcomes, largely due to the high degree of adaptation 
required by the MS.  Legal systems, particularly related to criminal justice, are strong 
and often based on well-established historical, social and cultural traditions.  Even in 
cases where legal frameworks are relatively similar, such as in drug offences, often 
legal practice varies greatly (EMCDDA, 2009b). 
The continued differentiation of domestic policies is expected to continue, not just 
due to the legal traditions but also because, vitally, the drug situation varies greatly.  
In these circumstances it is unsurprising that common policy responses are difficult 
for MS to agree on.  Domestic logics are informed by local contexts and institutional 
traditions, whilst EU logics seek common solutions.  In these circumstances the EU 
has attempted to impact on domestic policy at a higher policy level.  Rather than 
seeking a change in policy settings it seeks to encourage a common European 
approach, or paradigm (Hall, 1993).  The EU has consistently promoted evidence-
based policy making and emphasised the importance on both gathering reliable data, 
and using this data in the policy evaluation process. 
Since the development of the New Public Management approach the UK has based 
its policy process on similar principles to the EU.  It has sought to greatly increase 
the information it produces as a means of supporting certain policy responses or 
justifying resource allocation.  In the drug supply area, SOCA is one example of an 
agency almost entirely dedicated to the production of information.  The UK was 
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instrumental in promoting this approach in the EU, in the field of law enforcement, 
and the move to Intelligence-led policing, as a concept in European law enforcement, 
can be largely credited to the initiative of the UK. 
In terms of Europeanization processes, the impact of the EU on domestic institutions, 
in the field of supply reduction, has been limited.  The intergovernmental nature of 
the area has provided MS with many opportunities to veto EU initiatives.  Contested 
integration has been especially strong in areas which involve the sharing of 
operational resources and the functioning of criminal justice.  The EU has been far 
more successful in promoting communication and in creating policy networks, that 
have been instrumental in the formation of shared approaches to policy-making.  The 
EMCDDA is now one of the most well respected institutions in the field and it 
produces some of the most reliable drug data available.  It is particularly important in 
supplying comparable European level data which allows the drug phenomenon to be 
seen in its wider context and so strengthens the perceived value of European action. 
Whilst the body of information on public health and social responses has been 
strengthened by the long and close involvement of academic researchers from across 
Europe, who have helped develop rigorous standards of data collection, information 
on supply reduction is still some way behind.  The EMCDDA has made strong 
moves, in recent years, to actively engage law enforcement agencies in the activities 
of the agency and the EU has made it a priority to develop better supply reduction 
indicators. 
The UK remains enthusiastic about cooperation in supply reduction but outside of 
formal EU institutions.  There has been a large amount of bilateral activity and 
agreements that the UK has taken part in, but it retains full sovereignty over its 
actions.  The impact of the EU in supply reduction in the UK can most clearly be 
seen in the adoption of harm reduction as a guiding principle of UK law enforcement 
responses.  The basic idea that resources should be focused on preventing the 
greatest harm has long existed as principle in public health but this approach has 
been appropriated, not without complaint from actors in other fields, by agencies 
such as SOCA. 
This paper has gone some way to create a better understanding of the processes of 
European integration in the field of drug policy.  Drug policy presents very specific 
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challenges to policy analysts, not least the multidisciplinary nature of the area.  It is, 
however, an area with a great deal of opportunity, particularly in political science, 
and it is surprising that so little has been written about it.  The conclusions of this 
study point to a number of potentially rewarding research agendas for the future, not 
least the expansion of the Europeanization analysis across a comparative sample of 
countries.  Keeping with the main findings of this study, one of the most interesting 
aspects for future research would be to develop a better understanding of the 
dynamics of the policy networks that exist on the national and European level.  There 
is a fundamental role played by the NFP in the policy process, not just in the 
collection of data and information, but in the generation of common European 
standards and the development of a shared policy space. 
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Annex A – Supply reduction in the EU Drug Action Plans 
I. EU Drugs Action Plan (2005-2008) 
Strategy aim 27.1 
Strengthening EU law enforcement co-operation on both strategic levels and crime prevention levels, in order to enhance operational 
activities in the field of drugs and the diversion of precursors 
Aim Action Proposed Timetable Responsible 
Party 
Assessment 
tool/Indicator 
18. Reduce the production and 
supply of synthetic drugs 
Develop a long-term solution for the use of 
forensic profiling of synthetic drugs for law 
enforcement purposes building on previous 
experiences 
2008 MS 
COM 
Europol 
COM Report 
19. Target money laundering in 
relation to drug crime 
Implement joint operational projects Ongoing MS 
Europol 
Eurojust 
Number of projects initiated 
or completed 
Drug related criminal cash 
flows detected and disrupted 
20. Utilise confiscated 
assets to finance drug 
projects 
Explore the possibility of developing a fund to be 
used for joint operational projects to be financed 
from the confiscation of assets earned through 
drug production and trafficking 
2007 COM Study on best practice in the 
establishment of such a fund 
21. Explore possible 
links between drug 
trafficking and financing of 
terrorism 
Conduct research into possible links between 
drug trafficking and financing of terrorism 
2007 COM 
MS 
Research completed 
22. Step up work on 
prevention of drug 
related crime 
Assess extent of drug related crime in the EU 2006 MS 
EMCDDA 
Compilation of the existing 
studies to be presented by the 
EMCDDA to the COM by 
2008 
Availability or perceived 
availability of drugs at street 
level, price, purity and 
potency (EMCDDA) 
23. Examine drug related crime 
prevention practices in third 
countries 
Conduct a study on drug related crime prevention 
practices in third countries 
2008 COM Study completed 
24. Increase training for law 
enforcement agencies 
CEPOL to include in its annual work 
programmes more training courses for law 
enforcement agencies specifically relating to 
combating drug production and trafficking 
2006 CEPOL Additional relevant training 
included in the CEPOL 
Annual Work Programme 
from 2007 
Strategy aim 27.2 – 27.3 
Intensifying effective law enforcement cooperation between Member States using existing instruments and frameworks 
Prevention and punishment of the illicit import and export of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances 
25. Step up and develop law 
enforcement  cooperation 
between Member States and, 
where appropriate, with third 
countries, Europol and/or 
Eurojust against international 
organized drug production and 
trafficking 
1. Implement joint operational projects, such as 
joint investigation teams, joint customs 
operations and a European transport police 
cooperation network 
Ongoing MS 
Europol 
Eurojust 
Number of joint operational 
projects initiated or 
completed 
Quantity of precursors and 
drugs seized 
Number of criminal groups 
disrupted 
Number of illicit laboratories 
dismantled 
2. Europol to compile and disseminate an 
assessment of the threat to the EU arising from 
drug production and supply 
Bi-annual MS 
Europol 
Assessment report 
26. Combat serious criminal 
activity in the field of precursor 
chemical diversion by stepping 
up law enforcement 
cooperation between Member 
States and, as appropriate, with 
third countries, Europol and/or 
Eurojust 
Implement joint operational projects such as the 
European Joint Unit on Precursors 
Ongoing MS 
Europol 
Eurojust 
Number of joint operational 
projects initiated or 
completed 
Quantity of precursors and 
drugs seized 
Number of criminal groups 
disrupted 
27. Prevent the diversion of 
precursors, in particular 
synthetic drug precursors 
imported into the EU 
1. Implement the EU precursor legislation, in 
particular the cooperation between MS in relation 
to controls of imports of synthetic drug 
precursors and strengthening customs controls at 
the external border of the EU 
Ongoing MS 
COM 
Number of risk controls 
established 
2. Support international operations of the UN 
INCB (International Narcotics Control Board), in 
particular Project Prism 
Ongoing MS 
COM 
Number of operations 
initiated or completed 
Strategy aim 27.5 
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Intensifying law enforcement efforts directed at non EU countries, especially producer countries and regions along trafficking routes 
28. Establish and expand 
networks of Member State 
liaison officers in producer 
countries and countries along 
trafficking routes 
1. Each network to meet to improve operational 
cooperation and coordination of MS action in 
third countries 
Twice a 
year 
MS Number of meetings held 
2. Implement operations with law enforcement 
agencies of third countries 
Ongoing MS Number of operations 
initiated and completed 
 
II. EU Drugs Action Plan (2008-2012) 
III Supply Reduction 
Main priority: a measurable improvement in the effectiveness of law enforcement in the field of drugs at EU level. Europol, Eurojust and 
other EU structures to fully exercise the respective roles for which they were created, in the interest of efficiency, EU compatibility of national 
initiatives, intra-EU coordination, and economies of scale. 
Objective Action Timetable Responsible 
Party 
Indicator 
11. Enhance effective law 
enforcement cooperation in 
the EU to counter drug 
production and trafficking 
22. To target those criminal organizations posing 
the most serious threat by making full use of the 
intelligence-led concept of the European 
Criminal Intelligence Model (ECIM) and its 
component parts 
Ongoing MS 
Europol 
Eurojust 
Council 
Nr. of criminal organizations 
targeted by MS 
 23. To increase the number of multidisciplinary 
law enforcement operations, involving Europol 
where appropriate, as well as police, customs and 
border control services, through joint 
investigation teams (JIT) and joint customs 
operations (JCO) 
Ongoing MS 
Europol 
Eurojust 
Increase in Nr. of drug 
related 
JITs/ JCOs 
Assessment report on results 
achieved 
 24. To improve the quality of intelligence data 
provided by Europol National Units to Europol's 
Drugs Unit, with emphasis on the highest levels 
of organised crime 
Ongoing MS 
Europol 
Consistency, relevance and 
quality of data and 
intelligence received 
 25. To make full use of the COSPOL projects 
(heroin, cocaine, synthetic drugs) linked to 
Europol drug-related projects, including 
coordinated analysis through Analysis Work 
Files (AWF) 
Ongoing MS 
Council 
Europol 
Increase in identifiable 
operational results 
 26. The European Police College (CEPOL) to 
provide relevant advanced training for senior 
police and customs officers and for liaison 
officers in 3rd countries through national police 
training Colleges 
Ongoing CEPOL 
MS 
 
Curriculum developed for 
drug law enforcement 
Additional relevant training 
included in CEPOL AWP 
Nr. of training courses 
Nr. of officers trained 
 27. To make more systematic use of Member 
State liaison officers in third countries for the 
exchange of information and intelligence 
between MS law enforcement agencies and 
Europol, where appropriate 
Ongoing MS 
Europol 
Increase in international 
operational law enforcement 
cooperation 
12. Respond rapidly and 
effectively to emerging 
threats (e.g. emerging drugs, 
new routes) 
28. To set up, where necessary, regional security 
platforms (e.g. MAOC-N, Baltic Sea TF) to 
counter emerging threats by means of 
coordinated operational responses. Such action to 
be compatible with existing legal and operational 
arrangements at EU level and based on specific 
threat assessments (see also action 42) 
Ongoing MS 
Council 
Europol 
Timely operational response 
putting in place measures to 
pro-actively handle risk and 
minimise threats 
Increase Nr. of criminal 
operations disrupted 
(seizures, changing 
trafficking behaviour) 
 29. The EU to focus on coordinated and joint 
efforts between the Member States most highly 
exposed to particular drug production 
/ trafficking phenomena, in cooperation with 
Europol as appropriate 
Ongoing MS 
Europol 
Council 
Operational and strategic 
outcomes of MS action 
taken 
13. Reduce the manufacture 
and supply of synthetic drugs 
30. Member States to actively maintain law 
enforcement cooperation/joint operations in this 
area and to share intelligence and best practices. 
Optimal use to be made of Europol's Project 
SYNERGY and the related COSPOL initiative 
Ongoing MS 
Europol 
Council 
Increase in Nr. of joint 
projects initiated/ completed 
Increase in Nr. of dismantled 
production facilities reported 
to EILCS 
Nr. of SYNERGY reports 
generated 
 31. To adopt and implement an EU-wide system 2012 COM System in place and 
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for the forensic profiling of synthetic drugs based 
on the experience gained through projects such as 
SYNERGY and CHAIN, the structure and 
expertise of Europol and the Commission‟s Joint 
Research Centre, and ongoing MS law 
enforcement activities and experience in this area 
Europol 
MS 
operational 
14. Reduce the diversion and 
trafficking in the EU of 
chemical precursors used for 
the manufacturing of illicit 
drugs, in particular synthetic 
drug precursors 
32. The EU to maintain a clear and unified 
position on this matter at international level and 
within the UN, based on existing legislation and 
cooperative practices with the private sector 
Ongoing COM 
Council 
MS 
Effective coordination 
through the relevant Council 
committees 
Joint EU positions in 
international fora 
 33. Customs services to integrate precursor  
controls at a strategic level, enhancing the 
effectiveness of border control management, 
and to coordinate more closely with other law 
enforcement agencies engaged in anti-drug 
operations (mutual support) 
Ongoing MS Improvement in precursor 
control, detection, seizure 
and profiling situation 
compared with 2008 
 34. The EU to give full support to international 
operational cooperation aimed at preventing the 
diversion of drug precursors, such as the INCB-
led projects PRISM and COHESION 
Ongoing COM 
MS 
Increase in Nr. of stopped 
and/or seized shipments 
 35. To evaluate EU drug precursor control 
legislation and its implementation 
2010 COM 
MS 
Evaluation completed 
 36. The EU to develop, where possible, 
cooperation agreements with principal identified 
source countries of main synthetic drug 
precursors 
Ongoing COM Agreements established 
Reduction of illicit 
shipments of drug precursors 
from the countries 
concerned 
15. Reduce the impact on 
society of organized crime 
active in drug production and 
trafficking 
37. To facilitate the confiscation and recovery of 
the proceeds of drug-related crime across the EU 
by strengthening the policies on confiscation and 
asset recovery at EU and national level 
2012 MS 
COM 
Council 
EP 
COM Communication 
adopted 
Legal instruments proposed 
and adopted  
Assessments of assets seized 
 38. To support the establishment of effective 
Asset Recovery Offices in the Member States 
through the creation of an informal platform. To 
support investigations through the Europol's 
Criminal Assets Bureau 
Ongoing COM 
MS 
Europol 
Platform established and 
working effectively 
Increase in No. of supported 
investigations relating to 
asset tracing and 
identification 
Increase in Nr. and value of 
cash and assets confiscated 
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